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1 Introduction
Infraglobalization
What looks the strongest has outlived its term
The future lies in what’s affirmed from under
(Seamus Heaney)1
Another globalization is not only possible, it already exists. This book advances 
what I term infraglobalization as a catalytic socio-spatial concept and practice 
with emancipatory potential for greater grassroots agency. In this book I build 
a case for a propositional praxis for the reclamation of ground-up globalization, 
which involves multiple pathways towards development with social justice. As 
an interpretive framework, infraglobalization is conceived as a contrapuntal way 
of seeing, knowing and doing that can contribute to the creative constitution of 
global and local processes. From the outset my argument adheres to the idea that 
strategically asking the question ‘what is already being done?’ rather than ‘what 
is to be done?’ may be a more enabling entry point that helps foster greater auton-
omy for various grassroots groups and movements. With the southern Indian state 
of Kerala as my principal empirical locus, I investigate a number of already exist-
ing alternatives as well as the prospects for a plurality of successful strategies, 
which also may exist in parallel with ‘neoliberal’ restructuring. These include 
participatory planning and community-led microenterprises as an alternative to 
corporatist-led microfinance.
In this Introduction, I outline this book’s problématique and aims, as well as 
lay out an alternative framework I have developed for apprehending globalization 
and grassroots agency. These contours, which I suggest have moved from sub-
sumption to sub rosa geographies, are both descriptive and normative. In devel-
oping my argument, I call into service a spectral metaphor,2 wherein the ‘infra’ 
prefix underlines the value of the less visible (as specifically refracted through 
what I identify as the ‘public transcript’, corporatist lens) as well as the infor-
mal, which seeks to strategically broaden the subjects, spaces and constituency 
of globalization. Infraglobalization – which might also be suitably described as 
the infrageographies of globalization – is conceived as a propositional socio-
spatial interpretative framing; I abjure the oppositionally framed terms such as 
‘counter-globalization’ and ‘anti-globalization’ (less so the more satisfactory 
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‘alter-globalization’) and make the case that ‘infra’ is more enabling and more 
accurately reflective of reality. Infraglobalization is introduced as a socio-spatial 
imaginary and heuristic that applies and extends James C. Scott’s complementary 
notions of infrapolitics, the public and hidden transcripts, and mētis, all of which 
underline the role of informal order and sub rosa agency in social reality.
Infraglobalization is presented as a contribution towards developing a propo-
sitional politics of development and a socio-spatial grammar of instauration. It 
contributes to rethinking globalization and agency through refraction (ways of 
seeing), ontological politics (ways of knowing) and, to showcase but one template 
of a propositional and prefigurative politics (ways of doing), Kerala’s democratic 
decentralization and social economy experiments. These three dimensions coincide 
with Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the propositional heart of this book, in contradistinction to 
Chapter 2, which outlines the oppositional case. My focus is on the active prefigu-
ration of alternative spaces and practices in the present, of ‘worlding’ in the here 
and now rather than a predetermined politics of deferment and waiting.3 Worlding 
is here employed as a verb rather than a subject-object, reflecting a process-based 
orientation that involves reading and bringing the increasingly shaped possibilities 
of the future into the present. It is informed by the notion that we – and I use ‘we’ 
throughout the text invitationally – need to imagine and enact new worlds if we are 
to break free from subordination to the imperatives of capitalist accumulation.
This book is also a contribution to the argument about the production of space 
and how the way we imagine space has direct agential implications. I seek to 
employ the infraglobalization heuristic as a layered spatial differentiation that rec-
ognizes the importance of depth as well as breadth in imaginaries framing globali-
zation, informed by the idea that manifold realities may inhabit the same space. 
This spectral metaphor is thus also very much spatial, one that draws on space and 
social processes as multiplicity rather than singularity. In doing so, I assert that 
this is a way globalization may be reclaimed and redeemed from a singular and 
narrowly sectional corporatist representation underpinned by what I identify as 
a ‘command and control’ ontology of dominatory space. This works to produce 
an ideologically limited circumscribing of agency, extrapolated from a view of 
space as subject to necessarily only one, all-encompassing trajectory, whether it 
is imperial or neoliberal.
Perceptions of space frame epistemological parameters and thus help shape 
the way power, authority and agency are understood and enacted. Different ways 
of seeing globalization itself contribute toward bringing it into being, in the same 
manner time-zones operationalize what is really a constructed imaginary. While 
much attention has been focused on the practices of power and domination that 
attach to this singular conception of space, this book is an acknowledgement that 
greater attention might better be directed to the production of progressive space 
that corresponds with fomenting and amplifying grassroots agency. This book 
takes as its point of departure the disabling limitations of what I call conventional 
interpretations of social and political space for investigating contemporary prac-
tices within the framework of globalization. I will focus on prospects for human 
agency and preclude ‘posthuman agency’ – while I am sympathetic to the strategic 
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decentering of human beings to bring in considerations of nature and processes, 
I am also concerned at over-inflating the concept of agency for my purposes here, 
such that any ‘actant’ has agency, including inanimate objects.4
The book endeavours to contribute towards a socio-spatial framework more 
appropriate to meet this challenge, recognizing that the organization of space 
has clear political impacts, that socio-spatial imaginaries matter and that repre-
sentations of space help circumscribe our self-perceptions, ways of ordering the 
world and behaviours. With agential concerns in mind, a number of argument 
summaries and propositions follow. The following summaries preclude detailed 
references, which appear in the corresponding chapters. These argument summa-
ries and propositions are grouped around what I have identified as the following 
three syndromes of globalization and grassroots agency (Figure 1.1) in which a 
shift from subsumption to subversion to sub rosa subvention is both discerned 
and advocated. Throughout the text these are embedded in, rather than tightly 
circumscribing, the organization of chapters, and the book bears their imprint in 
the manner of a research argument watermark. I also attach the qualification that 
these three syndromes, which will each be examined in turn, are not envisaged as 
an unproblematic linear progression – all three may exist contemporaneously in 
different contexts and across various places, spaces and scales. I assert that the 
third, sub rosa subvention, offers the best possibilities for constructing enduring 
global grassroots autonomy.
Subsumption
The assumption of this form of globalization is that the whole world is headed 
along the same path. In such a framing imagination the whole uneven geogra-
phy of the world is reorganized into a historical queue. Geography (a spatial 
simultaneity of differences) is turned into history (seen as a single succes-
sion). Both space and time suffer here: on the one hand the contemporaneity 
of space is obliterated; on the other hand temporality is reduced to the singu-
lar. There is one historical queue (one model of development, say), and it is 
defined by those ‘in the lead’ (there is one voice). An evident result of this 
manoeuvre is that those supposedly ‘behind’ in this queue have no possibility 
(no space, precisely) to define a path of their own. Their future is foretold.
(Doreen Massey)5
Reflecting dramatic changes from the early 1970s onwards, capitalist globaliza-
tion has become a mainstay concern in the social sciences. Whether variously or 
Subsumption Subversion
Sub rosa  
   Subvention
Figure 1.1 The ‘sub’ syndromes.
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at once understood as cliché, leitmotif, axial organizing principle (regulation and 
restructuring), a set of material processes, a historical period, and a set of dis-
courses, this conception of globalization has as its main assumption that globali-
zation takes only one major form – which is characterized here as corporatist – to 
which other forces can only react or accommodate and which necessarily erases 
the contemporaneous heterogeneity of the world. The global spatiality of what I 
define as corporatist globalization is an extension of this singular linear progres-
sion described by Doreen Massey in the quote above. In this book, I employ the 
term ‘corporatism’ to denote a subsumptive approach that can characterize both 
state and market players, with the common characteristic of a totalizing singular-
ist occupation of socio-spatial reality. Subsumption is also understood here in its 
wider adjectival meaning as ‘the act of subsuming or the state of being subsumed’ 
rather than in its specific, albeit similar, application in Marxist social theory.
This highly particularist but conventional projection of globalization subsumes 
all other reality into its self-conceived purview, which marginalizes and buries 
other ways of understanding, constituting and participating in global processes. 
After Scott, I have adapted a concept to describe this conventional representation 
of globalization as ‘public transcript’ globalization.6 The majority of public pro-
cesses and events, including resistance and civil society, are here consecrated to 
the public ‘official’ transcript, upon which conventional social scientific research 
mainly focuses, in contradistinction to the offstage critique by subordinate groups 
in what Scott describes as the ‘hidden transcript’. I argue that this distinction 
offers a way to think beyond the hegemonic narratives and dominant accounts 
of globalization and structural geopolitics, accounts that tend to be narrowly sec-
tional and both reflective and reproducing of dominant power structures. These 
conventional accounts often leave out the rest of the body politic, treating only the 
public event. It also corresponds with ‘great man’ theories of ‘high politics’ that 
commonly reduce complex global phenomena to the designs and proclivities of 
the most visible actors and institutions.7
Conversely, some presentations may so privilege structure over agency, even 
in critical accounts, that they are purveyors of a subjectless structuralism that hides 
the agency of the powerful as well, and instead attributes causality to abstrac-
tions, which may suit an ideological purpose. Whether actors at various scales are 
privileged, marginalized, hidden or excluded, orthodox globalization can imbue 
impersonal processes and institutions with agency rather than people, impelling 
an acceptance of the seeming inevitability of what I will identify as the neoliberal 
political project. These structures are endowed with superhuman agency out of 
which there may only be a resultant fatalism – this is much closer to medieval 
than modern modes of thinking! Without denying the importance of structure or 
entering into the perennial structure–agency debate, the degree to which this focus 
on ‘restructuring’ has colonized discourse is apparent in the lack of a corollary 
concept to restructuring. To wit, there has been no equivalent concept of ‘re-
agencying’, which has generally been denoted by the term ‘post-structuralism’.
This depiction is also crucially one of clear and total universalizing capitalist 
hegemony, expressed in critical accounts in such concepts as ‘neoliberal market 
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civilization’ (Stephen Gill, 1995) and ‘capitalocene’ (Jason W. Moore, 2013), a 
way of organizing nature.8 In the latter, Moore views as problematic the notion of 
the Anthropocene – where humanity is assigned as a geological agent in a short 
two-century modernity– and argues a more fitting term is Capitalocene, where 
capitalist ‘world-ecology’ is situated in a historical long-view ‘shaped by rela-
tions privileging the endless accumulation of capital . . . a civilization that joins 
the accumulation of capital, the pursuit of power, and the production of nature as 
an organic whole’.9 Capitalist world-ecology is a world-praxis that sees capital-
ism as environment-making process, and these environments ‘include factories no 
less than forests, homes no less than mines, financial centers no less than farms, 
the city no less than the country’.10 Similarly, in Nitzan and Bichler’s conception, 
dominant capital (defined as the wealthiest 0.01 per cent) do not merely mould 
or shape the social order, they create the order, or ‘creorder’ in their neologism.11
These are all powerful and percipient critical characterizations, but my conten-
tion is that descriptions like these may foreclose on progressive political possibili-
ties. Capital has been conferred with unprecedented power to define not simply 
our political economy but has become an assignation that characterizes our con-
temporary civilization and ‘world-ecology’. While it is true that virtually anything 
that can generate an income stream can be capitalized and thus subsumed, includ-
ing nature, DNA and the future, it need not colonize our imaginations and ability 
to conceive and practice alternatives also. So while I do not contest the subsuming 
nature of dominant capital, I do consign it to one bandwidth of reality that does 
not nearly make up the whole spectrum. For example, I take on board Nitzan and 
Bichler’s cogent characterization of capitalism as a mode of power, but I would 
also seek to qualify this insight. First, I identify layers to this creative ordering 
which takes the creordering monopoly away from dominant capital and confines 
it to the public transcript. My argument is that it is not simply the purview, prerog-
ative or power of dominant capital, through capitalization, to creorder the world, 
to which all of us are subject and straitjacketed. Informal order, I argue, may be 
the ‘dark matter’ of what is a manifold creordering, present but not as visible or 
quantifiable, and yet more greatly constitutive of what exists.
Second, in recognizing the way much oppositional work re-inscribes the dis-
cursive dominance of capitalist reality, neoliberal capitalism is characterized as 
an ideology that structures the coordinates of the reality it purportedly merely 
describes. Here, social Heisenberg principles are at play with neoliberal meas-
ures and assumptions; human beings are not the atomistic, rational self-seekers 
and individualistic maximizers of these ideologies, but neoliberal structures are 
performing the human subject into its own image. Re-appropriating this process 
of re-subjectification is a key strategy explored in Chapter 3. Also, as Peck and 
Tickell point out, as the primary ideological rationalization for corporate globali-
zation, or its ‘operating software’, neoliberalism is a system of metaregulation 
that self-defines and passes itself off as a system of non- or anti-regulation.12 It is 
a project that in Thomas Lemke’s words ‘endeavours to create a social reality that 
it suggests already exists’.13 To what extent can we reboot and reinstall this ideo-
logical operating software or challenge the perceived primary of this platform?
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Corporatist globalization also bears the imprint of the rationalist high  modernist 
impulse, which consists of the belief that the social order can, and should be, 
redesigned in accordance with supposedly scientific universal laws, often pre-
sented as inevitable and incontestable. This extends Scott’s observations about 
the state’s high modernist schemes to the market, whereby market and transna-
tional institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
may be replacing the state as the imposer of subsumptive legibility, evidenced in 
the one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter development prescriptions emblematic of those 
institutions.
As well as extending rationalism to neoliberalism and corporatism’s global 
marketization project, as John Ralston Saul has also intimated, an ideology of 
supremacy that has the same subsumptive impulse informs both military and eco-
nomic doctrine – from ‘full spectrum dominance’ to neoliberal structural adjust-
ment policies.14 Material and martial thinking alike can be seen to be informed by 
the subsumptive impulse, and the policy of full spectrum dominance, the avowed 
US military policy of pursuing omnipotence announced in 1997, could be viewed 
as the military expression of subsumption.
Recalling Doreen Massey’s point in the quotation above, the high modernist 
translation of spatial heterogeneity into a uni-linear temporal sequence – wherein 
different countries are situated along a progress ‘queue’ behind the West – draws 
directly from a rationalist command and control ontology. This involves mas-
tering, conquering and colonizing what is essentially closed and singularly con-
ceived space rather than creatively co-inhabiting it. This view of space also draws 
directly from classical scientific laws, not simply from space as a Euclidean con-
tainer but also on the Newtonian premise that no two objects can occupy the same 
physical space at the same time. With space fixed or immobile, corporatist capi-
talist relations can more easily subsume all – or spurn spaces not deemed useful 
to dominant, oligarchic capital. This more easily begets processes of servitude, 
control and zero-sum power. This cosmology is important in constituting power 
relations – and it is also crucial, I argue, in reconstituting them (see Chapter 4).
Both the exercise of capitalist globalization and the rationalism that animates 
it is here recognized as a form of domination, without which there can be no 
appropriation – or accumulation for that matter. Rationalism is a central pillar of 
modernity; its domination is not intrinsic to rationalism but is produced when all 
other things are subsumed to it, when it becomes instrumentalized. The interesting 
question of the tyranny of instrumental rationality is outside the parameters of this 
book and is necessarily only alluded to here. Suffice to say, as an ordering mecha-
nism and philosophical impulse, part of the tyranny of rationalism, as Michael 
Oakeshott has observed drawing upon Blaise Pascal, is ‘not its recognition of 
technical knowledge, but its failure to recognize any other’.15 This speaks directly 
to the subsumption purveyed by this projection of globalization.
Despite its tendency to scientism and scientific pretensions, neoliberal globali-
zation is certainly itself not devoid of normativity, but can be deftly presented 
by its exponents as already existing reality (if not inevitability), thus accord-
ingly enacted through the way perception powerfully affects and shapes reality. 
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Hence, globalization is commonly represented as a powerful set of forces from 
beyond the more local community and the nation state, to which there are few realis-
tic alternatives (as if each individual alternative needed to be a behemoth to supplant 
all of capital ‘G’ corporate globalization!). From about the 1990s, this representation 
of globalization has become entrenched as a discourse that normalizes certain ways 
of looking at the world and what is possible within it. This includes the greatly trum-
peted role of global civil society and the role of Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs), which I argue have to a significant degree been made captive to the public 
transcript of globalization. Largely co-opted sections of civil society take on an 
essentially ameliorative and limited role in this corporatist subsumption.
The best non-capitalocentric processes can get in this conception is Lilliputian 
status while the corporatist ‘giants’ retain top billing. On the one hand, it is true 
that to examine globalization is to also examine neoliberal theory and practice, as 
many of its exponents have actively sought to conflate neoliberal principles with 
globalization in privileging the regulatory mechanisms and norms of the (glo-
balized) market over the nation-state. On the other hand, a large part of the criti-
cal literature in social science has been solely oppositional in intent and content, 
competently demonstrating the flaws of neoliberalism but sometimes locked into 
critique and even appearing to accept and reinforce its perceived dominance by 
default. Part of my argument is that examining the fragmented and uneven nature 
of ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’,16 though a valuable endeavour, is only part 
of the repertoire of strategies toward enacting just policies. I argue we should also 
apply our attention to its actually existing alternatives as well, studying health and 
not just disease; that globalization should be, and is, also about non-neoliberal 
realities often unrecognized or consigned to the local scale, clearly no match for 
the goliath globalization its advocates have used to try to ideologically colonize 
the global scale.
These strategies are testament to realities outside that are presented and shaped 
solely by corporatist interests. If it is accepted that the corporatist state and mar-
ket can subsume all space, then it is being imbued with far more power than the 
informal order that it is in fact undergirded by. To what extent do we, as scholars, 
activists, ordinary citizens, allow neoliberalism and neoconservatism to colonize 
our social reality? Does only corporatist capitalism make its order to which we 
are all subsumed?
The limits of conventional globalization: beyond subsumption
The key propositions here are that the conditions of global possibility may 
partly be shaped and conditioned by corporatist capitalist socio-spatial relations, 
amongst other influences, but are not subsumed by them: there is a world, or 
worlds, outside of the ‘public transcript’ representation of globalization, currently 
dominated by neoliberal conceptions and practice, which has always existed and 
continues to exist.
Recognizing the role of socio-spatial imaginaries in legitimating certain power 
configurations is also a recognition that contemporary imperial representations of 
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global reality serve to reproduce social inequality, and that it is in the interests of 
social justice that progressive scholar-practitioners frame their own understand-
ings towards a more genuine democratization of globalization praxis. This project 
involves decolonizing globalization from a high modernist command and control 
ontology, and producing heuristics that might better ferment progressive political 
enactments.
Subversion
To exist is to resist
(Unknown)17
A conceptual intermediary between subsumption and sub rosa geographies, sub-
version seeks to challenge processes of subsumption but may not succeed in escap-
ing the gravitational pull of conventional globalization. I argue that this is because 
subversive movements may over-rely on reactive resistance rather than cultivat-
ing propositional alternatives. Oppositional politics and resistance are important 
strategies but may nevertheless persist in ontologically privileging the primacy of 
conventional, public transcript globalization, in which subsuming corporatism is 
dominant. The way resistance and alternatives are represented is itself problem-
atic and can be bound by the same frameworks and ontologies that undergird con-
ventional globalization accounts. This plays out in a number of ways, including 
in terms of strategies: when set up as marginal or minute, it is not surprising that 
alternative, overlapping and parallel systems such as local currencies or fair trade 
systems are easily dismissed, derided as marginal, as wanting to ‘wish away’ or 
‘write out’ capitalism. But such discourses of ‘resistance’ and ‘local alternatives’ 
are sometimes deployed in ‘straw man’ arguments; actors may not seek to replace 
corporatism with another singular subsuming narrative but to change the totaliz-
ing singularity of all systems and to create space for alternatives.
Departing from the traditional historiography of asymmetric power relations 
and resistance among dominant and subordinate groups, James C. Scott argues 
that a dissident political culture develops through potentially subversive cultural 
practices in disguised forms, which he terms ’infrapolitics’. This may include sub-
versive satire, vernacular languages, tax evasion, foot-dragging, folklore, jokes, 
songs and sabotage. Like infrared rays, infrapolitical activity may not be visible 
or legible to those who wield public power nor fit into their narratives, which he 
terms the public transcript. It is infrapolitical because practices and discourses are 
illegible to state and official authority and invisiblized in the public transcript – 
legibility here translates into visibility. Infrapolitics is offered as a way to look 
below the surface of apparent accommodation by the dispossessed to recognize 
how outward consent can mask practices of subversion. Wielded as ‘weapons of 
the weak’, infrapolitics operates in what Scott identifies as ‘hidden transcripts’, 
or offstage discourses of subordinate groups. Subversive, covert and surreptitious 
resistance is less well documented and its illegibility to power-holders in the pub-
lic transcript often has tactical advantages.
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Human agency and resistance here may take many forms, often ingenuous and 
hidden – and ingenuously hidden, with a ‘hidden in plain sight’ quality. Open, 
‘declared’, political action is often only the visible tip of the iceberg and Scott 
significantly posits infrapolitics as the elementary, foundational form of politics, 
the ‘building block for the more institutionalized political action that could not 
exist without it’.18 Tactical invisibility can provide requisite cover to incubate and 
eventually to publicly mount strategies. The disguising of resistance in the hidden 
transcript may not however lend itself to historical or social scientific documenta-
tion, at least not in the public transcript, and Scott avers that subordinate groups 
themselves may even be complicitous in contributing to a sanitized official ver-
sion in order to cover their tracks. The upshot is that apparent and outward com-
pliance does not necessarily mean capitulation, and that subversion can occur with 
an apparently less obtrusive corrosion of hegemony.
The idea of a hidden transcript underscores the role of informal order in con-
stituting more of the spectrum of reality, including globalization, than is conven-
tionally represented in the public transcript. The representation of socio-spatial 
processes has been dominated by formal institutions and official actors, which 
the work of a number of social scientists has highlighted and sought to remedy. 
This informal order is animated by a long incubated yet adaptable grassroots intel-
ligence and ‘folk wisdom’ Scott calls mētis after the ancient Greeks.19 In wielding 
high modernist ideology, applied from Prussian forestry techniques to the imposi-
tion of surnames upon villagers, central governments have often destroyed or lost 
this crucial local knowledge by attempting to force legibility on their subjects in 
the course of statecraft. In conjunction with a number of other conditions, grand 
statist schemes often fail when they fail to heed mētis. Pointing to such cases as 
the planned city of Brasilia and its unofficial counterpart city that sustains it, Scott 
asserts that the modernist project itself routinely relies on an unacknowledged 
‘dark twin’,20 within which one could include modern capitalism.
This also underscores how ways of seeing matter: what outwardly looks like 
consent can mask fertile acts of resistance. What looks like capitalism’s subsump-
tive domination of everything conceals (and crucially depends on) systems of 
mētis, mutual aid, informal order. When it comes to the capitalist behemoth, in 
other words, the object appears larger than it really is. Informal practices that 
make up the bedrock of reality on the other hand, are concealed and are variously 
insubordinate and illegible to the former which it quietly parallels, and without 
which capitalism could not operate.
In globalization praxis, this segues with the roles of resistance and informal 
order, with two major points to draw out about its extensibility. The first is the 
apparent similarity between the notion of mētis and that of social capital. In under-
standing mētis as local know-how and practical savoir faire that exists infrageo-
graphically – outside the reach of the public transcript – it might be considered as 
a mode of knowing and doing that is deeper than social capital, particularly social 
capital as it is understood and played out in the public transcript version of global 
civil society. I thus consider there are at least two layers of informal order, that 
underneath the public transcript’s civil society with its more visible social capital 
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there are infrapolitical processes and spaces informally governed by the native 
intelligence of mētis.
Second, infraglobalization is not here conceived as simply a ‘gap’ between 
state and market, as civil society is sometimes framed. Aligning with Scott’s orig-
inal conception, infrapolitics is recognized here as the foundational form of poli-
tics rather than as interstitial spaces and practices that occur between the public 
transcript corporatist mainstays of ‘market’, ‘state’ and ‘labour’. I make the case 
that infraglobalization may be intersectional and interstitial depending how you 
look, and whether it is refracted through the conventional globalization lens. It is 
here acknowledged as a major section of the spectrum of order and reality in its 
own right.
The optical dimension of this argument is also related to how the ideological 
hegemony of dominant groups is predicated upon projecting a particular way of 
seeing the world and upon then apparently having it accepted and internalized 
by subordinate groups as common-sensical or natural.21 This not only inverts the 
relationship between the dependency of the formal upon the informal, but within 
the purview of this book it also relates to how initially grassroots innovations 
and concepts like social capital and microfinance can be appropriated and colo-
nized, such that critical development accounts may refer to them as ‘paradigmatic 
of neoliberalism’. This could also be described as the formal order’s attempt to 
mimic and replicate for its own purposes the properties of the informal order, its 
mētis.
Yet the notion that a hidden globalization underwrites public transcript-visible 
processes is one where it essentially plays a supporting rather than leading role. 
Sites and circuits of the informal economy, from households to community co-
operatives, local economies to transnational networks, may effectively underwrite 
the formal, more public-official processes but, I argue, are also important in their 
own right and not simply as subordinate adjuncts to public transcript processes, 
which are presented as the reality. A hidden transcript replete with resistances 
may succeed in disrupting the naturalized hegemony of the formal sphere of eco-
nomic activity, its claimed correlation with the global scale and comprehensive 
universal application across diverse socio-spatial spectrums, successfully subvert-
ing the idea that corporatism subsumes all, but its disruptive effects stop short of 
efforts at creation and construction.
Historically, recognizing the public transcript order as an arbitrary power 
configuration is a crucial first step in developing political consciousness and to 
developing alternatives: undoing the perceived hegemony of corporatist global-
ization is exposing its uneven, heterogeneous, contradictory, fragmented and par-
tial character that is belied by the appearance of cohesion and contiguity. There 
are however discernible limits to subversion, from its cooption and weakening 
of dissent through the covert planting of official propaganda to the funding of 
‘astroturf’ groups that mimic the appearance of and effectively manufacture fake 
grassroots movements (so named as astroturf is a Monsanto product of artificial 
grass turf). Corporatist interests can covertly act in ways that range from ‘con-
trolled opposition’ such as the use of gatekeepers and planting moles, to the US 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and neocon foundation funds that have gone 
towards exploiting the genuine resistance in the various international ‘colour rev-
olutions’, for example, such as the ‘Orange’ and ‘Rose’ revolutions in the Ukraine 
and Georgia respectively.
It is also significant by way of appropriation and subsumption that interna-
tional organizations and financial institutions have strategically imbibed social 
movement and community-inflected language, such as ‘participatory’, ‘commu-
nity’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘self-help’. Critics have charged that ‘participatory 
boosterism’, for example, fails to address questions of power, inequality and pov-
erty and serves to depoliticize conflicts, enabling the smuggling in of aggressive 
neoliberal practices. Pablo Leal, for example argues that it is no coincidence that 
participation ‘appeared as a new battle horse for official development precisely 
at the time of the shock treatment of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
inflicted . . . by the World Bank and the IMF’.22 The adaptability of progressive 
forms to different contexts means they are also at risk of being captured by neolib-
eral ideology. Several processes have both a cooperative and a corporatist concep-
tion in which the latter appropriates, co-opts and makes it legible for the public 
transcript, such as decentralization and corporatized microcredit. Decentralization 
in the hidden transcript occurs in the context of fostering autonomy and reducing 
reliance on or subjection to the coercive state apparatus and/or corporatist capital. 
Self-help in the corporatist public transcript has been appropriated in the context 
of welfare roll-backs. My contention is that any claimed relationship between 
neoliberalism and practices such as decentralization is ideological, it is not natural 
or given.
Similarly, one of the foundation myths of capitalism is that it either invented 
or has a monopoly on entrepreneurship, or that it is the only system that has, 
or exemplifies, a ‘market’ economy, such that even the term ‘market’ is often 
used synonymously with it. Cooperatives and informal order did not come into 
being as ‘anti-capitalist’ forms. These forms pre-existed contemporary neoliberal 
capitalism. While practices can be appropriated and manipulated to give a self-
responsibility patina to justify the retreat of state and corporate responsibility, the 
point is that neoliberal ideology has no monopoly on process and meaning.
The spaces that attach to subversion have been recognized in social science as 
socially constructed, and relational rather than pre-given or absolute.23 Subverting 
corporatist singularity and its colonization of the global scale has also involved 
recognition in scholarship of the inseparability and co-implication of the local and 
global; that the global is not just aggregative (the sum of local processes or their 
network connections) but also generative, that is, measured in terms of extension 
of influence. Places and communities as constituted by the complex networks and 
multiple social relations that span across the globe are thus global through those 
processes, and through the carriage of their influences and effects. In other words, 
the global is not just ‘out there’, networks of various reach, scope and intensity are 
co-present and co-constitute everyday practices.
Subverting the corporatist production of space rather than conceding it to be 
‘free’ for neoliberal capital is an important step, a recognition that an impoverished 
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view of space-time also impoverishes the spectrum of political possibilities. More 
than that, it erases realities, lifeworlds, voices and multiple pathways. The con-
ception of space as closed, immobile, depthless, the opposite of time rather than 
inseparable from it (as the most contemporary conceptualizations even in phys-
ics have had it for decades) has increasingly been challenged by the emergence 
of alternative post-Euclidean imaginations of space and scale. I argue that these 
emergent subversive efforts are promising but bear full fruit in a modality where 
they are recognized as meriting independent consideration, not only as reactions 
to that which they challenge.
Subversion can also more easily be controlled through the subsumptive impulse 
when located within the same singularist spatial ontology. Valuable approaches 
such as standpoint epistemology rightly highlight the importance of voices from 
the ‘margins’ that can afford insights not accessed at or from the ‘centre’; these 
may multiply perspectives yet still be rooted in the same singularist spatial ontol-
ogy, however. An imaginary that is characterized by a radical multiplicity of reali-
ties, rather than simply perspectives within a singular reality, may help challenge 
these limitations.
Up the ante, transcend the anti
The key proposition here is that the efficacy of grassroots agency within glo-
balization praxis depends upon a ‘both-and’ amalgam of propositional and not 
just oppositional action. Agency is richer than conventional accounts allow and 
the ‘infra’ framing is a way of breaking the conceptualization straitjacket of glo-
balization as domination versus resistance, which often locks communities and 
movements into a limited reactive, oppositional mode. Following on from this, 
globalization’s informal order – what I have termed infraglobalization – crucially 
underpins and is the greater parallel to the formal public transcript globalization. 
Grassroots strategies such as decentralized governance and microenterprises 
succeed insofar as they allow the cultivation of, and do not harm, this informal 
order, which may be deeper than civil society as represented in public transcript 
accounts and are less amenable to conventional social scientific measure. The 
informal order’s relative invisibility when viewed through the conventional lens is 
recognized as a representational artifact of the public transcript and belies the fact 
that, like gravity, it is akin to a force that helps hold everything together. An over-
regulated, top-down control and command globalization can stifle and destroy the 
informal order upon which it is often parasitical.
It is possible and productive to distinguish between the corporate framing 
of globalization and globalization’s progressive enactments beyond a limited 
‘anti-’ or ‘counter-’ framing. Disentangling globalization from its corporat-
ist colonization with which it has been ideologically conflated challenges the 
monochrome rendering of global reality. The next steps toward taking back 
the power to author, enact, bargain, perform and create involves a more vivid 
palette of colours that I argue more closely matches lived realities, and offers 
greater scope for agency.
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Sub rosa subvention
Never again will a single story be told as if it is the only one.
(John Berger)24
In this modality, infraglobalization is elevated from an interstitial phenomenon, 
or one merely underlying formal global processes, to an imbricated reality that 
is a vibrant and fertile source of creative alternatives and both incipient and pre-
existing parallels in its own right. Infrageographies are envisaged as an expan-
sive, experimental and effervescent socio-spatial form, and its spaces conceived 
as multidimensional, contingent and constructed by human activity, unlike a 
subsuming conception of singular space based on the static Cartesian grid. If, as 
the book advances, space matters in how we constitute realities and engage with 
the world, new ways of imagining spaces outside of capital control is central to the 
projects for producing viable alternatives. This cannot be done, I suggest, within 
the rubric of dominant capital’s subsuming spatial frame.
A propositional politics of infraglobalization requires the long-view, and 
experiments and mētis may gestate over a long time-horizon. Laclau and Mouffe 
argued 30 years ago that plural democratic movements were shifting from a ‘strat-
egy of opposition’ to a ‘strategy of construction of a new order’,25 and this pro-
cess as understood here as a slow cooking hearty historical brew informed by 
such sensibilities as varied as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) phrase 
‘building a new world in the shell of the old’ to ‘do what you can where you are’, 
to paraphrase Ted Roosevelt.26 The worlding of futures by enacting alternatives in 
the here and now could be viewed as infraglobalization’s key strategy of forward-
looking prefiguration to capital’s forward-looking capitalization – the process 
by which expected future gains are monetized by present measures. In this vein, 
Gélinas similarly sees alternative political-economic forms as the seeds of a future 
order in which they may be the more prevalent modes:
Just as capitalism matured within the feudalism over several centuries before 
asserting itself as the dominant system, the alternative economy will likewise 
need to develop slowly within capitalism before gradually asserting itself in a 
community, a region, a country and finally throughout the world.
(Jacques Gelinas)27
These infrageographies are produced outside official arenas and consist of spaces 
and sites that are an important but under-represented part of the spectrum of glo-
balization. These may include, but are not limited to, the spaces of the community 
economy and the informal sector. They may involve utilizing grassroots circuits 
for information-sharing, solidarity, knowledge production, resource-pooling and 
policy development as seen, for example, in the World Social Forum movement. 
Supporting and subventing these strategies becomes a priority for a number of 
groups to respond more autonomously and in innovative ways as agents actively 
producing and ordering global reality. There are a wealth of local laboratories 
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of democratic decision-making, cooperative enterprises, alternative forms of 
exchange and participatory budgeting. Going by the measures of an old-style pro-
gressive politics, the figures may look discouraging, such as the decline in major 
political party and trade union membership over the past quarter century. But over 
this same period, the numbers involved in worker-owned businesses, for exam-
ple, has dramatically increased: even in the heartland of capitalist empire, the 
US, the numbers of worker-owners involved in cooperatives is estimated to have 
increased from 250,000 in 1975 to 11 million in 2014; and over a third of the US 
population are members of a cooperative.28 A new form of propositional politics 
is slowly supplanting the old politics.
Experiments may be discontinuous, ebbing and flowing with the dynamics of 
local institutions, the reshuffling of state and municipal governments and external 
influences, but their effects can be long lasting and have extensive reach. This can 
be seen both in the Porto Alegre model of participatory budgeting which lasted 
a decade and a half in Brazil (1991 to 2004) and spread as an adapted practice to 
countless cities and municipal councils around the world (see Chapter 3); and in 
Kerala’s decentralization, participatory planning and social economy experiment 
which was launched in 1996 and also went through spurts and setbacks depending 
on the see-saw swing of which state government presided every five year term 
(see Chapter 5).
Infraglobalization does not exist in dualistic opposition to public transcript glo-
balization as much as it is another and arguably much larger layer of social real-
ity occupying the same physical space, whose practices corporatist entities such 
as the neoliberal state cannot necessarily infiltrate, regulate or subsume. Parallel 
practices may include community-led alternatives to the market-determined and 
state-led appropriations of such practices as microfinance. I argue that micro-
finance is not circumscribed or ‘owned’ by neoliberalism nor is its wholesale 
corporatist commercialization and financialization inevitable. This book does not 
debate or document the clear shortcomings of donor-dependent corporate micro-
finance and cooperatives which are locked into formal financial circuits, but it 
bears emphasizing that there is nothing that auto-circumscribes practices such 
as microcredit, ‘self-help’ and decentralization as political technologies of neo-
liberalism, as the Kerala case study highlights. Similarly, the role of women and 
social reproduction can be recognized as central to global development because 
they happen to assume great importance in the integral informal order, rather than 
because they are the ideal-typical corporatized microfinance subjects. Practices 
can be hijacked by neoliberalism, or they can be harnessed more progressively in 
the service of socially just policies: the point is that they are neither ideologically 
pre-determined nor pre-disposed.
In view of these propositions, I ask how amenable is understanding Kerala’s 
contemporary development through an infraglobalization lens? What are the pros-
pects for planning as a participatory democratic enterprise (applied infraglobali-
zation?) and asserting autonomy over finance capital, as illustrated in a corporate 
finance-poor state like Kerala? Has Kerala’s experience of subventing home-
grown cooperatives and decentralized budget-supported participatory planning 
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as alternatives to corporatist globalization and microcredit been successful, and 
further, can it be replicated elsewhere? If so, what is it about Kerala’s cultural-
political milieu that makes its articulation of radical democratic practice and 
microenterprises possible? How does a state pursuing a redistributionist agenda 
fare in an ostensibly neoliberal period? Can governments and other governing 
agents abide by the principle and practice of primum nil nocere – first, do no 
harm – non-maleficence in at least protecting the mētis of communities? The book 
argues that while conventional social scientific frames may not be able to quantify 
or definitionally capture mētis, states can nevertheless still act to protect rather 
than destroy it.
Infraglobalization is also an imaginary suggesting greater attention be duly 
directed to people’s lived experiences with political spaces both of their own 
making and those that may also be circumscribed by others. The ‘everyday’ and 
sphere of social reproduction here also matter in constituting reality and in initi-
ating processes that may take on extra-local reach. It engages directly with the 
idea – and ideal – of greater autonomy, and the question of the degree to which 
social movements and communities develop alternatives outside a system appar-
ently tied to the desires and whims of corporatist elites. What are the possibilities 
for building strategic translocal, global alliances and cultivating subaltern agency 
and capacity to shape processes and help effect coordination at a distance?
The previous section foreshadowed the important role played by mētis, which 
here refers to grassroots cultural forms, norms and practices, and to vernacular 
wisdom, know-how and knack. It is a practical experiential knowledge that may 
never be fully comprehended in the public transcript. A mētis-based infraglobali-
zation acknowledges that: first, social relations, like ecological systems, are far 
more complex than can be modelled or conventionally represented; and second, 
that local knowledge is often not easily written down or ‘proven’ according to posi-
tivistic scientific conventions, thus rendering it invisible in the corporatist world-
view, to be devalued and often destroyed by high modernist planners. Exploring 
the experience of Kerala Sasthra Sahithya Parishad (KSSP) or People’s Science 
movement is an interesting vehicle for examining how mētis might be harnessed 
rather than harmed, particularly in Kerala’s successful literacy campaign which 
drew on indigenous cultural forms and social practices rather than imposing a top-
down program that might have ignored the population’s existing strengths.
Infraglobalization also implicitly recognizes the problem of over- determination 
inherent in public transcript representations of power. There are multiple ways 
various actors engage with, create and experience global flows – it is not simply 
about perpetrator/victim in terms of corporate capital and communities respec-
tively for example, nor only about accommodation versus resistance. It is also 
about sub rosa development wherein portability, adaptive replicability and net-
works of social movements and community strategies are possible. In other words, 
infraglobalization strategies travel too – why only confer mobility to corporatist 
forms?
These interweaving layers may parallel as well as intersect and overlap with 
civil society and social capital in its more public transcript guises, while not being 
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defined or subsumed by either. The point of distinction is that communities and 
movements may organize and operate in ways incommensurable with the public 
transcript rendering of reality, which requires practices to be legible for the pur-
poses of corporatist (state or capital) recording, classifying, containing, control-
ling and monitoring, often through force. They produce sub rosa geographies by 
virtue of their illegibility to corporatist forms.
In positing infraglobalization as a sub rosa socio-spatial ordering of reality, I 
make the case that ontology matters. It is significant, I suggest, that there is sup-
port for the radical multiplicity of reality in ascendant post-classical worldviews 
informing our ability to conceive of multiple realities occupying the same space. 
Infraglobalization accommodates co-existing contemporaneous multiplicities and 
manifold vernacular realities rather than making the ontological assumption that 
there is one true reality, as rooted in the classical Western tradition. If bodies and 
objects help produce, and not just occupy space, then it is possible to envisage dif-
ferent layers of socio-spatial reality which may overlap or intertwine around vari-
ous orbits people and groups generate. This then relates to the conception of space 
that attaches to infraglobalization, as superposed, imbricated layers of reality that 
may be intersectional as well as parallel, criss-crossing with other practices and 
spaces. These are contemporaneous rather than palimpsestic, the latter implying 
linear temporal succession.
In exploring the progressive catalytic potential of an infraglobal socio-spa-
tial framing, I underscore its experimentality. It might be envisaged as a social 
incubus, with spaces of experimentation and incubation, and capacity-building 
towards greater transformation: not every incubatory experiment may achieve 
successful transformation, but its gestation may generate highly beneficial social 
effects and contribute to mētis. This is perhaps how mētis has in fact been pro-
duced historically, through a good deal of trial and error, and an intimate and 
long-nurtured knowledge of practices rooted in particular times and places, and 
with mistakes simply adding to the store of grassroots knowledge.
Constituted at various scales, infrageographies are presented as sites of innova-
tion and not just amelioration, where subjects are posited as capable of initiating, 
and not simply interpreting. I am conscious to try not to reify or romanticize the 
subaltern, and recognize that socially or ethically regressive practices and customs 
may also exist infrageographically. This may, in turn, serve as a justification for 
not always warranted or appropriately executed state intervention, such as with 
the Roma people. This lies outside the purview of this book, wherein I employ 
the notion of a subaltern in a way that actually mainstreams the marginalized such 
that the numerical majority of people may identify both as and with the ‘subal-
tern’. In Kerala this strategy has historically played out with activists identifying 
with and embracing the struggle of the ‘untouchables’ rather than spurning people 
of this caste as external, with an inclusivist struggle that has helped to ferment 
Kerala’s remarkable history of social activism.
This book does not suggest that an advocacy of informal power should let 
formal power ‘off the hook’ or that it entails accepting any socially regressive 
rolling back of state functions such as a social safety net. The struggle to reform 
 Introduction 17
public, putatively representative, institutions is an important one, particularly as 
these institutions have often corroded the very values they have been set up to 
promote. Vigilance about formal power and holding it to account certainly need 
not preclude informal capacity building. Formal institutional state power is more 
complex and less monolithic than oversimplifications may imply, and while I 
have anarchist sympathies I in fact suggest the state may have a constructive, 
facilitative role to play as the case of Kerala illustrates, especially when there is a 
credible policy commitment from state representatives and agencies.
From critique to construction
The key propositions in this modality are as follows. Progressive politics requires 
a progressive time-space, which I have identified as comprising already existing 
and rich infrageographies that are incubatory, deep, and seek to achieve safe dis-
tance from corporatist surveillance, in part through illegibility. Infraglobalization 
is advanced in this book as a potentially progressive and multidimensional politi-
cal space, a layer of socio-spatial reality and of informal sub rosa ordering that 
corporate forces cannot always regulate, dominate or even reach. This recognizes 
not all spatial forms or differentiations can be derived or caused from the logic of 
capital accumulation nor in fact any singular and putatively all-subsuming logic. 
Resignifying space as deeply and dynamically layered and imbued with a multi-
plicity of form concomitantly helps multiply political possibilities – and actuali-
ties. Agents are recognized as capacious subjects who bring global processes into 
being, cultivate and nourish mētis, and build the terrain as they move. I argue that 
strategies are often best incubated infrageographically lest they be co-opted or 
crushed by corporate capital or repressive functions of the state, but that the state 
may have a facilitative role to play, as the case of Kerala shows with its participa-
tory planning programme and community-led microenterprises. The relationship 
with the state, depending upon the context, can be both facilitative and fraught, 
both productive and vexed.
It is not surprising many forms of social capital, both as concept and as asset, 
are too valuable not to be appropriated and instrumentalized by corporatism. I 
suggest that creating alternative practices involves a large degree of covert capac-
ity-building, drawing upon and cultivating mētis, until and unless institutional 
safeguards and commitments from the state are in place. This proposition will be 
explored in the case of Kerala (Chapter 5).
How the book is organized
The rest of the book is organized by four substantive chapters, followed by a brief 
concluding chapter. The chapters correspond with the three syndromes just out-
lined, with some overlap. The book seeks to distinguish between globalization 
as a more conventional onto-epistemology (Chapter 2) and as a ‘catalytic’ onto- 
epistemology (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and reflects the key aims of the book toward 
fostering viable social alternatives and alternatives-in-waiting, both established 
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and experimental. In devoting four chapters out of five to advancing alternatives to 
corporatist globalization, while only one describes the nature of the beast, I endeav-
our to circumvent the trap capable critical social scientists sometimes fall into of 
an over-focus on that which they are ostensibly trying to transcend. Neoliberalism 
is but one story of economic globalization and it is time the globalization debate is 
epistemologically decolonized and alternatives accorded due attention.
In the book, my intersectional approach is drawn primarily from the disciplines 
of politics and human geography, but is also informed significantly by anthropo-
logical and sociological contributions. I have endeavoured to bring to bear my 
interdisciplinary background; while this has advantages it also means the main 
empirical case study, about one quarter of the book, might assume less weight 
than conventionally expected in some disciplines relative to the theoretical frame-
work and conceptual contribution that I also explicitly seek to make. This book 
accordingly places considerable value on the contextual research surrounding 
issues raised in a study of Kerala as well as on their application in Kerala itself. 
The aim is to achieve a measure of breadth appropriate to the nature of an inter-
disciplinary research problématique.
In Chapter 2 I examine how corporate globalization currently prevails as the 
public transcript of capitalist political economy and social reality. The Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 has been a historic opportunity portal to observe how 
corporate capitalism and the neoliberal project work as a system of power. While 
neoliberalism is its ideology, I have adopted the broader term corporatist globali-
zation rather than neoliberal globalization to include other corporatist iterations 
such as what I identify as the neoliberal-neoconservative convergence. Focusing 
upon corporatist globalization also means scrutinizing capital accumulation crises 
which attend its functioning, and that have become more globalized and finan-
cialized since the early 1980s. Corporate-led, neoliberal globalization is situated 
against a number of larger currents and frameworks for grouping global socio-
spatial change, such as strategies for accumulation, patterns of regulation and the 
idea of periodic profit crises being instrumentalized. I argue that the ‘neo-neo’ 
convergence has served as a stop-gap resolution of recent capital accumulation 
crises, although it benefits different sections of oligarchic capital differentially, 
and that extreme financialization entails a violent, extractive, undemocratic and 
inequitable system that is neither sustainable nor successful by its own public 
transcript market measures, although it has amply rewarded sections of capital 
who have had a very good crisis. It has also entrenched and increased wealth-
based inequalities, as well as created new tensions and contradictions.
Chapter 3 articulates an alternative way of seeing and doing that recognizes 
and reflects a more enabling, agentially-aware globalization praxis. It posits both 
a project of transformation and transformational act of recognition in the way 
we see agential possibilities within globalization by rethinking the sufficiency 
of oppositional ‘resistance’ and shifting focus towards facilitating propositional 
geographies of enablement. Building upon work that recognizes parallel and 
‘interstitial’ geographies, I assert that examinations of human agency would do 
well to accord due weight and attention to sub rosa sites and processes and to 
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everyday actors for their crucial role in initiating, constituting and reproducing 
global processes. Advanced as a form of creation and not simply contestation, this 
chapter develops the idea of infrageographies of globalization, extending James C. 
Scott’s concept of infrapolitics and examining the idea of informal order. Against 
the identified limitations of what I have termed oppositional praxis, another way 
of seeing is proffered: rather than either accepting prevailing structures or simply 
‘resisting’ them, I argue that grassroots agents have created alternatives as well as 
the spaces for alternatives. Further, I propose that while many of the processes of 
the informal order effectively subsidize formal order, informal sector actors wher-
ever possible might fruitfully redirect more energy and resources toward subvent-
ing and incubating their own forms and practices, with a number of strategies to 
achieve this explored.
In Chapter 4 I focus on the ontological politics of grassroots globalization and 
identify an ontological turn in the framing of globalization theory and practice. 
In this chapter I assert that new agential possibilities are informed by and related 
to the ontologization of the globalization debate. In particular I consider what an 
ontological politics informed by quantum mechanics might look like and how 
this metaphysical framework is relevant to enacting, sustaining and reproduc-
ing development alternatives. I develop the idea that ontological pluralism is at 
the heart of what distinguishes grassroots infraglobalization from conventional 
corporate praxis, and that a more plural ontology has a direct bearing on con-
figuring globalization as a more participatory, democratic, transformative, agen-
tially-centred epistemology. This is refracted through an exploration of related 
debates which highlight the reciprocal co-constitution between the empirical and 
epistemological, such as method and representation, worldviews and worlding, 
theory-as-practice, space and scale and debates about how globalization is repre-
sented. These debates have important and interesting implications for agency and 
subjectivity and for the production of knowledge about globalization. Further, I 
argue these debates can directly inform processes fostering horizontality, plural-
ity, sub rosa and parallel development, mutuality, self-governance and participa-
tory development.
In Chapter 5 I focus upon the southern Indian state of Kerala’s recent initia-
tives in participatory planning, decentralized democratization and micro-enterprise 
initiatives as key strategies for capacity-building toward a propositional grassroots 
globalization. Kerala has long attracted well-deserved attention for its remarkable 
achievements in human development. The southern Indian state has achieved unu-
sually high social and human development indicators – first world levels of lit-
eracy, life expectancy and infant mortality – at a fraction of first world incomes. 
The classic Kerala model, primarily concerned with redistributive policies, strug-
gled however to induce significant economic or industrial development. In deal-
ing with this challenge and with second-generation development problems such as 
educated unemployment, gender inequality and industrial development, the state 
undertook one of the boldest experiments in participatory decentralization ever 
undertaken in the subcontinent, and one of the largest in the world. These initia-
tives expressly seek to combine social and productive objectives at the local level, 
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with cooperatives and Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs) as major development 
agents and community capacity-builders. In this chapter I suggest Kerala’s devel-
opment can also be understood by situating its contemporary experience in an 
emergent ‘regime of empowerment’ which is markedly different from its ‘classi-
cal’ period. I propose that Kerala’s institutionalization of this experiment can offer 
lessons and prospects by way of alternative, parallel developmental and social 
economy pathways, and that Kerala’s experience illustrates the importance of both 
public and infrageographical action to its success, which cannot simply be adduced 
to responsible government action or the role of epistemic elites. Kerala’s experi-
mental politics can be understood as collective prefiguration – to be worked out 
and determined by its citizen-planners as a living, breathing, open-futured process.
The book now turns to Chapter 2, which examines how corporatist capitalism 
is often presented and accepted as a singular force, as a referent that describes a 
variety of relations between the state and the economy that nevertheless occurs 
within a monist ontological framework. The chapter examines how crises are 
increasingly functional to the operation of neoliberalism in what has been termed, 
since the so-called Global Financial Crisis, its ‘zombie’ phase. It also spotlights 
the commodification of social capital, wherein the work of emergent community 
development organizations, intentionally or otherwise, serves a reform and ame-
liorative capacity within co-opted sections of civil society. Much of this ‘NGO-
ism’ may be essentially non-threatening to the established order, existing within 
the same ontological framework as corporatist globalization. I also argue cor-
poratist globalization is a militarized globalization, and examine the apparently 
increasing subsumptive convergence between neoliberalism and neoconservatism 
since the turn of the millennium.
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2 Corporatist globalization
A world in its own image
In fact, when I consider any social system that prevails in the modern world, 
I can’t, so help me God, see it as anything but a conspiracy of the rich to advance 
their own interests under the pretext of organizing society. They think up all 
sorts of tricks and dodges, first for keeping safe their ill-gotten gains, and then 
for exploiting the poor by buying their labour as cheaply as possible. Once the 
rich have decided that these tricks and dodges shall be officially recognized by 
 society – which includes the poor as well as the rich – they acquire the force of law. 
Thus an unscrupulous minority is lead by its insatiable greed to monopolize what 
would have been enough to supply the needs of the whole population . . . 
(Thomas More, 1516)1
The [Bush administration] aide said that guys like me were ‘in what we call the 
reality-based community’, which he defined as people who ‘believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality’. I nodded and murmured 
something about Enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ‘That’s 
not the way the world really works anymore’, he continued. ‘We’re an empire 
now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying 
that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll act again, creating other new reali-
ties, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s 
actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’.
(Ron Susskind)2
Capital is a symbolic representation, and very real manifestation, of power. It is 
a vendible commodity that projects the commodification of power, increasingly 
anchored in the fictitious and nominal, rather than in the means and assets of ‘real’ 
production. With the increasing disjunction between speculative and productive 
economic activity particularly from the 1980s onwards, financialized capital has 
increasingly become more prominent, and is identified in many accounts of glo-
balization as effectively spearheading the processes of contemporary economic 
globalization. The growing density and depth of market transactions appar-
ently extends the calculus of capitalization, accumulation and profitability to as 
many domains as possible, from public utilities to warfare to public institutions. 
The 2000s and 2010s has also see a new arsenal of accumulation strategies that 
involve the instrumentalization of crises, where the operative word may indeed 
be ‘arsenal’.
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Situated within the historical frame of long phases of capitalist accumulation, 
my focus in this chapter will be on the predatory financialization of capital since 
the mid-1970s and, suggestive of Susskind’s encounter in the quote above, capi-
tal’s putative constitution of social reality, reminiscent of the Marxist concept of 
subsumption. Since Marx – who thought that illusory or fictitious capitalization 
was secondary to understanding real capital such as commodities and the means 
of production measured in the value of labour time – financialization has become 
the template for the contemporary power of dominant capital, broadly understood 
as the top 0.01 per cent of US based corporations ranked by market capitaliza-
tion.3 Financialization has been understood as a ‘pattern of accumulation in which 
profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production’.4 Related to this, securitization is defined as the 
process of bundling up assets so they will yield defined income streams. While 
financialization is understood as a contemporary phenomenon, it is in many ways 
the apogee of a long capitalization process that started in the burghers of Europe 
six centuries ago and codified mathematically in the mid-nineteenth century.5
In corporate capital’s public transcript – the way it views itself and dissemi-
nates its myths – dominant capital creates its own order, its own reality, measured 
and quantified in terms of accumulation and the capacity to be commodified and 
exploited, and defines it for all others. Marx’s dictum that we make our own his-
tory, but not under conditions of our own choosing, prompts the question: who or 
what creates those conditions? In the ‘steamroller’ conception of globalization, 
only capital has substantive agency to create historical realities, becoming a sin-
gularity to which everything is subsumed. This subsumption forms the basis for 
what I have grouped as conventional theories of globalization: those theories that 
share the postulate that only capital’s agents and processes really have the capacity 
to create the major spatial-historical realities to which all the rest of us play only 
bit-parts: adopting, adapting, ameliorating or resisting (or, as Susskind’s hubristic 
correspondent suggests, consigned to studying it!), but never really shaping or 
creating in the same fashion. This book rejects this notion, and without simply 
‘wishing away’ or ignoring these tendencies, I argue that the great majority of us 
who do not deal in complex ‘high’ finance or conglomerate corporate  capitalism – 
what I describe in this chapter as dominant or oligarchic capital – also create our 
own global realities outside the reach of this ‘public transcript’ projection of glo-
balization. I assert that this projection buries other realities that also lie outside of 
the often corporatized notion of a global civil society.
In the subsumptive view, modern contemporary civilization itself becomes 
defined as one cohered by capital as value-in-motion, one that appropriates and 
organizes nature and strives to make a world in its own image. The self-actual-
izing dynamic of making value commensurate across space and time injects a 
logic of equivalence so that money will continue to be the same thing across time-
spaces. Capitalism is a system that both internalizes as well as externalizes costs: 
it externalizes nature’s ‘free gifts’ (human and physical nature and unpaid labour) 
yet also strives to internalize everything into its purview for subsumption and 
appropriation. Maximizing the appropriation of unpaid work – work outside of 
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the formal circuits of capital – is central to the subsidy and surplus of capital, yet 
over time also increases the costs of accumulating capital and becomes a bottle-
neck, as more relations of reproduction once outside these formal circuits become 
monetized.6 This unpaid work is a central part of the ‘cheap labour’ Jason W. 
Moore identifies as one of the Big Four ‘cheaps’ of labour, food, energy, and raw 
materials in capitalism’s ‘cheap nature’ strategy central to the cyclical renewal of 
capitalist accumulation, a dynamic that involves capital setting in motion ‘a civi-
lization that aims to maximize the unpaid “work” of life outside circuits of capital, 
but within reach of capitalist power’.7 Capitalist appropriation is predicated upon 
controlling but not completely capitalizing life-making reproduction as unpaid 
work, because it is only against this unpaid work that capital can accumulate, 
despite the contradictory movement to monetize these relations. Unpaid work is 
vital because ‘(v)alue only works when most work is not valued’.8 Gender and 
physical nature have of course been central to this appropriation.9
At this juncture it may be useful to unpack what is meant by capital as a prelude 
to similarly unpacking globalization from its ideological garb. I make a number 
of simple distinctions. The first is to distinguish between smallholder capitalism 
and conglomerate capitalism. Though it is the former, more plural, template that 
is usually invoked as the ideal, it is the latter, more oligarchic than genuinely 
competitive version that crowds out and corrodes the former, swallowing self-
employed small to medium businesses over time. This is reflected in the patterns 
of profit over time: the net profit of a ‘Fortune 500’ firm was 500 times bigger 
than the US average in the early 1950s; by the late 1990s, it was around 7,000 times 
larger, a 14-fold increase.10 The tendency toward oligopoly and monopoly is sug-
gested in Karl Marx’s observation: ‘One capitalist always kills many’.11 As Barry 
Lynn notes for more contemporary times and with a focus on the United States,
Another sign of a free market is the expansive space it provides for entrepre-
neurs. But from 1948–2003, self-employment in America dropped from 18.5 
per cent to 7.5 per cent. Indeed, among developed nations only Luxembourg 
has a lower rate of self-employment than we [US] do. There has been a new 
‘enclosure’ movement, as the spaces that used to be occupied by small retail-
ers, farmers and manufacturers have been colonized by the conglomerates.
(Barry Lynn)12
The second distinction, arising from the first and applied in the second half of 
the chapter, is to differentiate between different fractions of dominant capital. 
Dominant capital is not monolithic and may pursue different strategies for accu-
mulation. While some fractions of capital have traditionally favoured stability as a 
precondition for profits, more recently we have seen a more aggressive strain that 
instrumentalizes and overtly profits from crisis, and from a marked increase in 
financialization since the 1980s, where production is less important to the realiza-
tion of profits. Both General Motors and General Electric have increasingly made 
more of their money from their financial operations on the side, for example, than 
from their production raison d’être of cars and consumer goods respectively.13
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Over the past century, capital has become increasingly financial in form. 
Dominant conglomerate capital has fabricated a whole new arsenal of accumula-
tion techniques such as corporate amalgamation and complex financial instru-
ments such as derivatives. The consequence of this disjunction between the 
material facts of production and financial accumulation, which was spurred by 
the emergence and growth of corporations as the principal form of business own-
ership, is described by Bichler and Nitzan:
Present-day capitalists own not the ‘means of production’, but a financial 
claim on corporate earnings. [Note that that the ‘objects’ owned by the cor-
poration, such as factories and structures, are merely instrumental to profit: 
they derive their capitalization not from their ‘productivity’ or their cost of 
production, but from the earnings they are expected to generate.] This fact is 
true for all capitalists, whether they own an automobile company, a software 
firm, a bank, a media conglomerate or a diversified financial portfolio. In this 
sense, we can no longer differentiate between ‘industrial’, ‘commercial’ and 
‘financial’ capitalists.
(Bichler and Nitzan)14
This goes to the heart of defining corporatist capitalism: capitalization is explained 
less by its productive articles that make up its assets than by what they can earn, 
and at what risk. The imperative of accumulation goes beyond production, and 
capital is financial rather than material, counted in earning power and risk rather 
than productive units and machines. Capital then is measured by the current mar-
ket value of risk-adjusted earnings rather than the perceived (market) value of its 
productive assets. Bichler and Nitzan go further in their description of capital as a 
mode of power rather than the labour and utility theories of value of Marxism and 
liberalism respectively, to declare that ‘(a)ll capital is finance and only finance, 
and it exists as finance because accumulation represents not the material amalga-
mation of utility or labour, but the continuous creordering of power’.15 For Peck 
and Tickell similarly, capital’s structural shaping power is directed through ‘(n)
eoliberal rule systems . . . [which] have the capacity to constrain, condition and 
even constitute political change’.16
As a process, capital functions as ‘forward-looking’ capitalization, which 
refers to the fact that asset prices are based upon what they are expected to earn 
in the future, a ubiquitous financial ritual that discounts expected future earnings 
to a singular present value. This principle of ‘discounting’ the future on the stock 
market prevails over trading on assets on the basis of today’s figures, which is 
described as backward-looking and ‘puts investors at the tail end of social dynam-
ics’.17 Capitalization acts as a ‘time transformer’: it condenses the long future into 
the singular present . . . [and] encapsulates their complex social and ecological 
causes into a single value – and then sends it back to the present’.18 Similarly, 
prices are the calculative language dominant capital use to express that power and 
its expected trajectory; it is the instrument by which qualitative power converts 
into and is reflected in quantitative accumulation.19 The subsuming power of this 
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system can be seen in the fact that any and every stream of expected earnings 
is potentially a candidate for capitalization, expressed in prices, from civil war 
to genetic codes – ‘(n)othing escapes the eyes of the discounters. If it generates 
expected future income, it can be capitalized, and whatever can be capitalized 
sooner or later is capitalized’.20
The emergence and rapid development in recent decades of a secondary market 
that involves financial instruments such as derivatives has led to endemic prob-
lems of instability arising from financialization, leveraging and surplus liquid-
ity. Yet this instability is also a source of sabotage-based profitability. Here, the 
profit motive is insufficient to explain capitalism’s drive: since power is relative, 
it is differential accumulation that dominant capitalists seek in order to beat the 
average rate of profit.21 Strategic sabotage is built into the capitalist imperative 
and involves more than the conventional assumption that capitalists always desire 
growth for profits. As Bichler and Nitzan aver: ‘if we think of capital as power, 
exercised through the strategic sabotage of industry by business, the relation-
ship becomes nonlinear – positive under certain circumstances, negative under 
others’.22 What we may be seeing, in Saskia Sassen’s words, is a more ‘brutal 
capitalism increasingly dominated by a financial logic that goes well beyond con-
ventional understandings of capital accumulation’.23
Taking this on board, it is useful to query the notion of accumulation, which 
leads to the third basic distinction, which is the notion of differential accumula-
tion. While pre-twentieth century accumulation could be conceived in absolute 
terms, one can do so far less reliably with twentieth and twenty-first century 
accumulation. Differential accumulation is the process by which dominant cap-
ital groups are driven to beat rather than simply meet the average rate of return, 
which is currently normalized as 3 per cent,24 because this has a direct result 
on an economic entity’s distributive market share: differential accumulation in 
fact ‘implies the existence of a “dominant capital” group which accumulates 
faster than the average’.25 Bichler and Nitzan employ the concept to mark out 
what sets dominant capital apart from other capitalists: ‘For the leading accu-
mulators, success and failure are a matter of differential profit. Their goal is 
to “beat the average”, and that makes them judge the world based on relative 
earnings’.26 The idea of differential accumulation became the compass of mod-
ern capitalism toward the end of the nineteenth century, ‘when corporations 
grew large enough and became sufficiently intertwined with state organiza-
tions to engage in systematic strategic sabotage’. It is also a process of social 
transformation.27
From the perspective of money power, the world is increasingly subjected to a 
unitary logic and viewed through a singular perspective – an exploitable corporate 
totality over the economy, nature, humans and the production of space. By total-
izing I mean in the sense of being all-encompassing and defining – which includes 
its own class. The imposition of that logic arguably serves to make dominant 
capital more predictable, and its actions more deterministic. The naturalization 
and global spread of the capitalization of power results in apparently more and 
more deterministic processes. As Nitzan and Bichler assert:
28 Corporatist globalization
To rule means to see the world from a singular viewpoint, to be locked into a 
unitary logic, to be subservient to your own architecture of power. Dominant 
capital cannot deviate from the boundaries of this architecture, even if it 
wants to. Its individual members are forced to accept the very logic they 
impose on the rest of humanity. And the more effective they are in impos-
ing that logic, the more predictable they themselves become . . . And as the 
capitalization of power spreads and penetrates, the world seems increasingly 
‘deterministic’ . . . It is the determinism of the ruling class, and only of the 
ruling class. It works only insofar as the ruling class rules. Admittedly, that 
happens most of the time. However, human beings do have the capacity to 
understand the fictitious nature of this ‘determinism’.
(Nitzan and Bichler)28
This reinforces the apparent structuralism of the public transcript of corporate 
global capitalism, and pits poststructuralist accounts and seemingly inadequate 
strategies against corporate capital’s verisimilitude. The extension of market rela-
tions is seen less as the temporary triumph of markets over states or society in a 
historical see-saw nexus,29 but as the wholesale attempt to permanently remake 
society as market. This danger of the belief in the sufficiency of the market was 
foreseen by Karl Polanyi and has been given contemporary expression by a num-
ber of social scientists such as John Agnew (‘marketplace society’).30 The power 
to order society becomes capitalized through central systems of property and hier-
archy, which fundamentally operate on exclusion. It becomes the means by which 
dominant capital makes the world legible, and apparently extends this legibility 
across more spheres.31 Capitalization could thus be described as a process of mak-
ing the world legible for dominant capital. Table 2.1 suggests a rough-cut perio-
dization by decade of corporate globalization, identifying neoliberalism and its 
later phase-shift amalgamation with neoconservatism as its animating ideology.
Origin of the specious: a lexical note
What’s fire? You can tell me about oxidation, but that doesn’t tell me a thing.
(Joseph Campbell)32
When asked what he would do if he ruled, Confucius replied that he would rec-
tify the language. Socrates also noted that to understand a thing, one must first 
name it. In this chapter, while abjuring the use of globalization in its singular, 
Table 2.1 A periodization of corporatist globalization by decade
1970–80 Neoliberal globalization: precursors
1980–90 Neoliberal globalization I: the ascendancy
1990–2000 Neoliberal globalization II: the consolidation
2000–10 Neoliberal-neoconservative globalization I
2010–20 Neoliberal-neoconservative globalization II
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benign form, without a qualifying descriptor such as ‘neoliberal’, I also subscribe 
to Arjun Appadurai’s observation that ‘the word globalization and words like 
freedom, choice and justice, are not inevitably the property of the state-capital 
nexus’.33 This reinforces the fact that neoliberal capitalist globalization is only one 
version of globalization – and may even be fragmented by variants of its own as 
suggested by Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore’s notion of path-dependent ‘actually 
existing neoliberalisms’.34 I also endeavour to qualify my application of the term 
‘corporate’ (and its adjective ‘corporatist’), which in its original sense simply 
refers to a functional community, and in a social and economic sense, has also 
been widely applied to describe tripartite negotiations and arrangements between 
business, labour and the state in setting economic policy. Its more contemporary 
usage is increasingly understood as referring to business corporations and to plu-
tocracy, which is the sense in which I employ it here.
The way ‘globalization’ is represented is inherently political; the way it is char-
acterized influences how it is reproduced and imposed. I identify conventional 
accounts as ones that ascribe most structural and agential influence to dominant 
capital, which may include otherwise insightful and valuable critiques that simply 
cede a great deal to the perceived power of dominant capital. Neoliberalism’s 
hegemony as a mode of discourse, as David Harvey notes, ‘has pervasive effects 
on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the com-
mon-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world’.35
I suggest that the neoliberal project in fact inverts reality when viewed as a 
wider spectrum of socio-spatial practices outside of the narrow public transcript, 
and this is facilitated by a legion of misnomers peculiar to it. Neoliberalism is 
decidedly illiberal in the classical sense, and specifically in the notion that free 
trade promotes harmony among nations: the global ‘free’ market has often been 
imposed through war, invasion, the imposition of conditionalities and crisis manip-
ulation (if not crisis creation). The corporate colonization of the debate reflects a 
perversion of language that involves cynical cooption and abuse of democratic 
slogans and tropes that are adopted and accepted even by critical analysts such as 
‘free’ market, ‘liberty’, ‘competitive’ and ‘reform’. The saliency of the distinc-
tions between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ and the ‘neo’ prefix that distinguishes 
their putative resurgence have also not been without contention.36 This appropria-
tion of terms seeks to confer legitimacy, universality, neutrality and verisimilitude 
of the ideological actions of highly sectional interests: everyone is for ‘sustainable 
development’, ‘empowerment’ and the benign- and beneficial-sounding ‘reform’.
‘Free market’ and ‘free enterprise’ for example, have come to mean almost the 
opposite, an oligopolic system that is more serfdom-like with increasing debts for 
most and fewer opportunities, and decidedly unfree for all but a minority around 
the world. (This brings to mind another definitional distortion in categorizing 
countries as developed or developing; where appropriate I choose to adopt the 
typology of Bangladeshi photojournalist Shahidul Alam who coined the terms 
majority and minority worlds in the early 1990s, or Global North and South.)37 
In an effort to avoid conflating corrupt crony capitalism with free markets I thus 
avoid employing the term ‘free’ market, and describe it instead as an unregulated 
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market, defined by what it lacks rather than by what it purports to be.38 I similarly 
abjure the uncritical use of such terms as ‘innovations’ when referring to complex 
financial instruments. The applied technology in missile warheads is also com-
plex: outside of military circles, does one commonly see nuclear weapons referred 
to as ‘innovations’?
In contrast to an understanding of economics as a set of socially constructed 
practices, the phrase ‘market economy’ belies the fact that it does not exist in 
unalloyed form, that all large economies are mixed economies.39 The language of 
deregulation commonly involves such phrases as the ‘freeing’ up of world trade 
and flows while government actions are framed as an ‘intervention’, somehow 
outside the normal and natural flow of things. The economy may be growing 
through the conventional measures such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but 
many people on average are becoming worse off. Recent ‘recoveries’ such as 
the stock rebound after 2002 have been jobless and reflect the inherent class bias 
in measures of ostensible ‘recovery’ (read: profit restoration by sectional class 
interests).40
Reflecting the fact that the corporatist globalization project is one advanced 
by very narrow sectional interests, it has been attended (and abetted) by the shift 
from representative to executive powers within the state-finance complex in many 
advanced industrialized states. A pillar of formal-legal democracy, a contract-
based legal system, is rendered meaningless when corporate rights, having taken 
on legal personhood, can routinely trump human rights and labour contracts can 
be scrapped with impunity through legal loopholes. Similarly, the notion of the 
sanctity and protection of private property is juxtaposed against the reality of 
literally millions of home foreclosures in the US alone. The ideological myths 
about markets as inherently more efficient, sufficient or self-regulating will not 
be explored here; suffice to say that as Bill Moyers has noted, ‘plutocracy and 
democracy don’t mix. Plutocracy too long tolerated leaves democracy on the auc-
tion block, subject to the highest bidder’.41
Unpacking globalization
It was prettily devised of Aesop: The fly sat upon the axletree of the chariot 
wheel and said, ‘What a dust do I raise!’.
(Francis Bacon, 1580)42
Definitions are important because they speak to the politics of knowledge con-
struction. It enables us to challenge the privileging of a particularist globalization 
worldview as the sole vision and set of practices. People, places, processes, actors 
and scales are marginalized, they are not marginal. This highlights that particular 
agents are doing the marginalizing, that it is a political act for a purpose. By way 
of illustration, Samir Amin posits that the global growth in the 1970s and 1980s, 
especially in the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), was actually driven by Third World development, and 
dubs it the Bandung era.43 In a similar fashion, a Financial Times editorial in 1998 
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acknowledged, ‘perhaps western pensions will be financed from the toil of the 
Chinese masses’.44 Viewed this way, who is really the engine of global economic 
growth and development, the financiers, or the toiling waged workers?45
As Peter Dicken has encapsulated, globalization is the most used, the most 
misused and the most confused word.46 This may in part arise from the fact that 
globalization is advanced as both the ‘explanandum’ and the ‘explanans’ of social 
change – embodying both the ‘what’ and the ‘why’, or both the question as well as 
the answer to the question. In this short critical survey, I will seek to be necessar-
ily selective and leave out a number of important conceptions outside the purview 
of my focus of corporate globalization. Here, it is accepted that a global shift, 
marking qualitative transformations from prior historical movements toward 
internationalization, has taken place. This chapter does not debate about whether 
one has taken place, about which an ample literature exists.47
Economic globalization is conventionally represented as the ongoing processes 
produced from the restructuring crisis that enveloped the industrialized countries, 
as well as a loaded idea privileging a particular idea about the economy’s proper 
or natural role in social life. In accounts that focus on formal economic sphere 
institutions, actors (such as transnational corporations) and processes, these global 
processes consist in part of the increased volume of international and transnational 
trade, technology and financial flows. The increasingly complex and spatially 
extensive geography of production, distribution, investment and consumption has 
been underpinned by rapid technological change in communications and informa-
tion technology and the reordering of economic, political and social relations such 
that economic relations between nation-states are now relatively less significant.
Other indices of corporate-driven globalization also include the growing 
share of a transnational corporation’s (TNC) foreign sales, employment, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) as well as the 
organizational and locational offshoring of firms and the relative importance of 
TNCs as non-state actors. The transfer of resources from the public to the private 
sector, the decline of manufacturing employment relative to the services sector 
and the increasing relocation of the former to industrializing countries, increas-
ing inequality and economic polarization both within and between countries and 
regions and apparent socio-cultural homogenization are also included. Though by 
no means exhaustive, these processes taken together are purportedly contributing 
to the accelerated integration of the world into a more interconnected – and newly 
hegemonic – global space, and as an intensifying and deepening of the processes 
of internationalization, producing greater qualitative integration of a world politi-
cal economy that has effectively been internationalizing over the past 500 years.
In contrast to the invocation of corporate globalization as a single, inevita-
ble, unidirectional, unqualifiably progressive, all-pervasive and all-powerful 
socio-spatial logic, critical scholarly definitions emphasize process, contention 
and contingency rather than an end-state or inevitable, teleologically determined 
result.48 Influential typologies of globalization have ranged from Held et. al’s 
widely cited ‘skeptics, hyperglobalists and transformationalists’ to the insightful, 
if initially confronting, idea of ‘queerying’ corporate globalization as an act of 
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capital penetration akin to rape (Gibson-Graham), to the idea of globalization as 
 triadization49 (Dicken, et al.), extending an earlier literature differentiating national 
and regional variants of capitalism (Cox, Turner and Trompenaars).50 Connected 
debates include the earlier New International Division of Labour (NIDL) thesis, 
which theorized the global shift from within the rubric of internationalization.51
Modes of regulation, regimes of accumulation
Regulation theory and the debate about Post-Fordism have also accompanied the 
globalization debate and the question about what type of shift has taken place.52 
For the regulation theorists, the Fordist era (1950s to the early 1970s) has been 
a particular focus, including its associated technologies of mass production and 
patterns of mass consumption as the engines of economic growth. The focus 
included the development by each major advanced industrialized country of its 
distinct variant of the broadly Fordist mode of regulation, which coalesced around 
a Keynesianesque consensus about the desirability of state involvement in eco-
nomic life. The debate about Fordism’s successor seemed to place greater empha-
sis upon localization processes in the emergence of Post-Fordist ‘new industrial 
spaces’ characterized by ‘flexible specialization’ and ‘flexible accumulation’ 
(Harvey), exemplified by complexes like Silicon Valley and the ‘Third Italy’.53
As indicated in the cycles shown in Figure 2.1, modes of regulation reached 
their apogee during boom periods; during recessionary ‘bust’ or crisis periods in 
the cycle downswing, they were increasingly exposed to dysfunction and subject 
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to various attempts at amelioration until a new mode of regulation emerged, with 
each era characterized by an often defining set of technologies or innovations.54 
Kondratiev long waves of development segues with the idea of systemic crises 
of capital accumulation in the global ‘core’ as the locomotive of world economic 
development, with contemporary economic globalization represented as the fifth 
Kondratiev wave triggered by economic crises in the 1970s. Contemporary glo-
balization can thus be conceived as a development following the disarticulation of 
the Fordist–Keynesian spatio-temporal fix.55
Identifying different modes of regulation within this pattern is a useful means 
by which to differentiate and periodize systems of regulation within capitalism, 
and it serves as an important reminder of how regulatory requirements change 
as capitalism changes. Adam Smith wrote on behalf of a growing commercial 
middle-class and called for greater laissez-faire in the market at a time when capi-
talism was in its infancy and there was a greater symmetry in the trading and 
wealth of nations. The regulatory requirements of neoclassical economics of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are decidedly different than they are for cur-
rent times, as E. H. Carr suggested in a traffic control metaphor in his classic 1939 
work The Twenty Years Crisis:
The tacit presupposition of infinitely expanding markets was the founda-
tion on which the supposed harmony of interests rested . . . traffic control 
is unnecessary so long as the number of cars do not exceed the comfortable 
capacity of the road.
(E. H. Carr)56
Another distinction useful for historicizing capitalist development and accumu-
lation strategies is to differentiate between global regimes of breadth and depth 
accumulation. According to this schema, global accumulation has oscillated 
between two broad regimes of merger (breadth) and stagflation (depth) over 
the past century (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). In certain periods, corporate mergers 
(breadth accumulation) rather than economic growth has become the main engine 
of differential accumulation; and in other periods, dominant capital benefits from 
inflation and stagflation (depth accumulation). These regimes tend to move coun-
tercyclically (Table 2.3), the conditions that are conducive for depth are not con-
ducive for breadth, and vice versa.57
These conceptions challenge the notion that green-field growth and price 
stability are always favoured strategies, and the authors assert that inflation 
Table 2.2 Regimes of differential accumulation
 External Internal
Breadth Green-field Mergers and acquisitions
Depth Stagflation Cost-cutting
Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New imperialism or new capitalism?’, Review, 
Vol. xxix, 2006, 1–86, table on p. 48. Reprinted by permission.
34 Corporatist globalization
(sparked by conflict and crises through the instrument of the price of oil) can be a 
major instrument of redistribution and a mechanism for differential accumulation:
Conventional views of accumulation often identify the gradual deceleration 
of green-field investment over the past century as an accumulation crisis. 
From the viewpoint of capital as power, however, this deceleration is a sign 
not of weakness, but of strength. Excessive capacity growth is disastrous for 
capitalist power. It needs to be carefully regulated, and corporate amalgama-
tion, in addition to its direct contribution to differential accumulation, does 
precisely that: it keeps capacity growth checked at its moderate, Goldilocks 
range.
(Nitzan and Bichler)58
Examining the long-view of crisis and accumulation strategies allows patterns 
to be gleaned as well as historically specific conditions that attach to particu-
lar cycles of accumulation examined for its relevance to the present and future. 
Accumulation strategies that worked at the beginning of a cycle may be progres-
sively exhausted and require revision or new strategies by the downswing, and 
between cycles. In the pendulum swing between breadth and depth as preferred 
regimes of accumulation, the most recent shifts have occurred at the turn of the 
millennium, from the neoliberal global (cross-border) merger boom towards con-
flict-sparked stagflation:
The most recent phase, which lasted through much of the late 1980s and 
1990s, was clearly one of breadth. In that period, dominant capital benefited 
greatly from the opening up to corporate takeover of the former Soviet Union 
and other ‘emerging markets’, as well as from the collapse of the welfare 
state and the massive privatization of government services. This breadth 
cycle, with its emphasis on neoliberalism, deregulation, sound finance and 
disinflation, came to a close at the turn of the new millennium.
(Nitzan and Bichler)59
Table 2.3 Periods of dominant regimes of accumulation by type
Period Dominant regime of differential accumulation
1890s to 1910s Breadth and depth
1920s Partial breadth
1930s Depth
1940s to 1960s Breadth
1970s to early 1980s Depth
Late 1980s to 1990s Breadth
2000s Depth
Source: Adapted from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New imperialism or new 
capitalism?’, Review, Vol. xxix, 2006, p. 62.
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Capitalist power is again here predicated on strategic sabotage rather than growth, 
using crises and unemployment, among other tools, in its redistributional battle. 
Based on an empirical examination of this relationship in the US since the 1930s, 
one reckoning is that ‘the best position for capitalists is not when industry is fully 
employed, but when the unemployment rate is around 7 per cent’.60 Nitzan and 
Bichler identify four major expansionist merger waves (Table 2.4) where buying 
(mergers) was preferred to building, throughout which the ‘buy to build’ ratio 
as a percentage of gross fixed capital accumulation has grown exponentially. As 
another expression of this, about three-quarters of all direct foreign investment in 
the 1990s occurred through corporate merger.61
While inflation is usually regarded as bad for profit, in this schema inflation 
is found to be a powerful engine for differential accumulation that has correlated 
with a ‘systematic redistribution of income from workers to firms, and from small 
firms to large firms’.62 The inflation strategy is more risky and socially destabiliz-
ing; crisis-based accumulation through prices and inflation tends to emerge ‘only 
when there is ‘no alternative’.63
[W]hy, in the absence of any real ‘shortage’, are buyers willing to pay higher 
prices? The short answer is that usually they are not willing; they are forced. 
And the way to force them is by creating, imposing and maintaining various 
forms of social crisis, apparent or real. Military hostilities during the First 
World War, the reparation crisis of Germany in the 1920s, the global oil 
crises of the 1970s, rising unemployment in Israel during the 1980s, political 
instability in Russia circa 1990s, debt default in Argentina in the 2000s are 
all illustrations of such inflation-triggering crises. The effect of these crises 
on inflation is twofold. On the one hand, they undermine the power of most 
people to resist price increases. On the other hand, they enable a ‘consensus’ 
to emerge within dominant capital that inflation can be used with ‘impunity’. 
In this sense, stagflation is the macroeconomic appearance of ‘accumulation 
through crisis’. Stagnation and unemployment, along with other forms of 
instability, conflict and force, constitute the necessary backdrop for differ-
ential accumulation through differential inflation. But the process is highly 
perilous. More inflation usually requires a more intense crisis and therefore 
implies mounting hazards.
(Bichler and Nitzan)64
Table 2.4 Merger waves of capitalism
Merger wave Period Spatial and organizational extent
Monopoly 1900s Individual industries
Oligopoly 1920s Sectoral
Conglomerate 1960s Cross-sectoral
Neoliberal 1980–90s Global
Source: Adapted from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New imperialism or new 
capitalism?’, Review, Vol. xxix, 2006, p. 51.
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Underpinning these shifts are deliberate policies and often coordinated strategies, 
and ones that can have dramatic social and political consequences, especially if 
persistent and permanent unemployment is part of the redistribution strategy. 
Giovanni Arrighi’s observation that periods of financialization have historically 
preceded shifts in hegemony makes this period of financialization even more 
interesting in its implications, which will be briefly explored later in the chapter.65 
In keeping with their typology, Bichler and Nitzan similarly aver,
During the past century, every transition from a major bear market to a bull 
run was accompanied by a systemic reordering of the political economy: the 
1920–1928 upswing marked the transition from robber-baron capitalism to 
big business and synchronized finance; the 1948–1968 uptrend came with 
the move from ‘laissez-faire’ capitalism to big government and the welfare-
warfare state; and the 1981–1999 boom coincided with a return to liberal 
regulation on the one hand and the explosive growth of capital flows and 
transnational ownership on the other.
(Bichler and Nitzan)66
In their conception, as we have seen, the capitalist mode of power transmutes 
between breadth and depth regimes; between major bear markets as it approaches 
an asymptote or never-quite-reached limit; and accumulation often occurs not 
through growth or dispossession but by redistribution – driven by a compulsion 
to ever-increase their distributive share of total wealth as well as beat the average 
rate of return. In an otherwise steady course of contemporary accumulation, there 
have been only two brief periods in which dominant capital experienced differ-
ential decumulation since the 1950s by their reckoning, in an otherwise steady 
course. The first occurred from the late 1970s, to the early 1980s, where there 
was a 20 per cent drop in differential accumulation, a decline that was arrested 
and reversed with the election of Ronald Reagan, portending two decades where 
policies of monetarism and neoliberalism held sway. The second decumulation 
occurred during the early 2000s, when the process again started to slow down with 
a significant drop between 2007 and 2009 that saw the differential income of the 
top 200 firms plunge by over 30 per cent.67
Unemployment has been one key tool in the arsenal of strategic sabotage and 
plays an instrumental role in differential accumulation; Bichler and Nitzan’s find-
ing is that for every 1 per cent increase in unemployment, there is 0.8 per cent 
increase in the capitalist share of domestic income three years later.68
If unemployment causes the price/wage ratio to decline, capitalists will fall 
behind in the redistributional struggle, and this retreat is sure to make them 
impatient for recovery. But if the opposite turns out to be the case – that is, if 
unemployment helps raise the price/wage ratio – capitalists would have good 
reason to love crisis and indulge in stagnation. 
(Bichler and Nitzan)69
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On a similar note, David Harvey has recently cited Alan Budd, an economic 
 advisor to Margaret Thatcher, who in an apparently unguarded admission con-
fessed that anti-inflation policies of the 1980s turned out to be ‘a very good way to 
raise unemployment . . . what was engineered . . . was a crisis of capitalism which 
recreated a reserve army of labour and has allowed capitalists to make high profits 
ever since’.70 These characteristics have intensified over the past quarter century, 
both in global spatial extent and depth. It is this major shift to which we now turn 
our attention for consideration in more detail.
Global shift
The conventional depiction of the scenario characterizing the material basis of the 
global shift needs only to be briefly reviewed. The post war ‘long boom’ in Older 
Industrialized Countries (OICs), lasting roughly from about 1950 to 1970, was 
a relatively stable period underpinned by Keynesian policies and dominated by 
Fordism – a system of mass production of standardized goods in large, vertically 
integrated, typically Taylorist factories. Fordism’s heyday coincided with a Pax 
Americana of the non-communist world – a US hegemony based upon a coher-
ent system of political-economic structures inaugurated at Bretton Woods, which 
provided world stability and order.
Capital accumulation was conducted largely within national boundaries until 
the early 1970s. Conditions for profitability and accumulation under Keynesianism 
and Fordism reached their zenith by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s and 
came to be increasingly corroded by underconsumption, overproduction, rising 
production and wage costs, and greater labour organization. The reconstruction of 
Europe and Japan and the rising wages, suburbanization and burgeoning market in 
North America had staved off major crises for nearly a quarter of a century.71 The 
very success of the long boom eventually produced the conditions for its break 
down – expressed as the ‘tendency for the rate of profit to fall’ in classical Marxist 
terms or, as economist Clément Juglar once put it, ‘the only cause of depression 
is prosperity’.72
One of Keynesianism’s basic premises was that the economy could be rescued 
from crises by measures carried out by governments who could guarantee next to 
full employment. This came undone with the onset of stagflation – unprecedented 
simultaneously high inflation and high unemployment – and the ‘fiscal crisis of 
the state’: governments were in danger of going bust pump-priming the economy. 
The inflationary impacts of the Vietnam War contributed to undermining the US 
dollar as the world’s reserve currency, and subsequently led to the demise of the 
Bretton Woods regulatory apparatus, notwithstanding the continuation of institu-
tions such as the World Bank.
The market saturation, rising production and wage costs and increasingly 
unwieldy, over-centralized and hierarchical mode of accumulation resulted in 
sustained no or slow growth, which, in corporate capitalism, by definition por-
tends crisis. Firms were increasingly compelled to respond with rationalization 
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and restructuring. From the late 1970s, the international liberalization of  financial 
 markets, the emergence of the Eurocurrency, new financial instruments and 
increased foreign direct investment resulted in a dramatic re-patterning of profit. 
The ratio of foreign-held assets to world GDP took off, effectively doubling 
every decade: it increased to 25 per cent in 1980, shot to 50 per cent in 1990, and 
climbed to over 90 per cent by 2000. US corporations’ surplus capital increasingly 
went offshore from the mid-1960s, a process that was stepped up into the 1970s. 
US-based firms in the 2010s currently receive about one third of their earnings 
from their foreign subsidiaries, up from about 5 per cent in the 1950s, but down 
from 60 per cent in the 1970s.73 With less emphasis on local activity and reliance 
on domestic sales, Keynesian policies started to lose traction.
A corresponding sea change occurred in the macroeconomic policies of OICs, 
signaling the ascendancy of a policy culture influenced by neoliberal ideology. 
This effectively ended the willingness of most governments to engage in deficit 
spending as a tool for economic stimulus, instead embarking upon a paring back 
of the welfare state, selective deregulation and privatization. Also conceptualized 
as the shift from ‘roll-back’ to ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism,74 the general ideology was 
that market forces should be ‘liberated’ from government interference to operate 
more efficiently, and benefits would trickle down to the rest of the population. 
What was a crisis of capitalist profitability was packaged as a crisis of govern-
ance.75 As stagflation and unemployment bit, labour and urban social movements 
across the advanced industrialized world organized for reform and state interven-
tion, which alarmed corporate elites who feared that the faltering social demo-
cratic model might give way to more radical alternatives.76
A rising tide lifts all yachts: the neoliberal counter-revolution
The major western democracies are moving towards corporatism. Democracy 
has become a business plan, with a bottom line for every human activity, 
every dream, every decency, every hope. The main parliamentary parties are 
now devoted to the same economic policies – socialism for the rich, capital-
ism for the poor – and the same foreign policy of servility to endless war. This 
is not democracy. It is to politics what McDonalds is to food.
(John Pilger)77
Neoliberalism operated on the margins of economic orthodoxy for decades until 
the crisis of capital accumulation of the 1970s. The crisis gave proponents an 
opening to propagate its ideological tenets, to re-establish the conditions for capi-
tal accumulation. A key indicator for this project can be seen in the fact that by 
the early twenty-first century, the corporate tax rate has reverted to roughly the 
same level as it was in the 1920s, before the establishment and expansion of the 
contemporary welfare-warfare state.78 Neoliberal prescriptions were commonly 
presented by governments and business advocates as an imperative, and, from 
the 1990s using the globalization smokescreen, as inevitability. The model is 
most closely associated with but not limited to the ‘Chicago school of economics’ 
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and Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, an economic playbook long on 
unfettered market triumphalism and short on its effects on real people. In this 
model, even before it became a political project, crisis or shock is recognized as 
transforming the ‘familiar world’ in which the period of disorientation that fol-
lows allows a government to do what might have otherwise been impossible under 
normal circumstances. Writing in the preface to the 1982 reissue of his manifesto, 
Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman articulated the strategy thus:
Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. 
That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing poli-
cies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes 
politically inevitable. 
(Milton Friedman)79
The model was deployed domestically within the US and UK particularly, as well 
as imposed internationally. The first neoliberal state restructuring experiment 
was kicked off in 1973 in Chile, one of Latin America’s most advanced indus-
trial economies, by the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende social 
democratic government. General Pinochet orchestrated the military coup with the 
support of the US government, forcing Chile’s overnight transformation by bring-
ing in the ‘Chicago Boys’ to manage the economy.80 The prototype for this ‘first 
experiment with neoliberal state formation’ was the CIA-backed coup of 1965 
in Indonesia, which saw Suharto ousting Sukarno.81 The Allende government, 
like the Sukarno government, was a ‘barrier to be overcome’ by capital to use 
Marx’s famous phrase in the Grundrisse. Neighbouring Argentina was also at 
the receiving end of force and pressure to dismantle its developmentalist policies, 
and opposition and dissent were quashed through large-scale murder and torture.
In July 1979, Paul Volcker’s tenure at the US Federal Reserve precipitated a 
dramatic change in monetary policy, which included activating the use of mon-
etary policy as an instrument of crisis creation and manipulation. The Volcker 
tactic of raising interest rates domestically in the US, for example, served to dra-
matically increase the foreign earnings that borrowing countries like Mexico had 
to put into interest payments, pushing it into bankruptcy and austerity. Under the 
direction of then US treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, a new generation of 
neoliberal economists based at Harvard intervened further afield, setting up fire-
sale privatizations in countries from Russia to Bolivia. Deregulation also provided 
a window of opportunity for the rapid rise of China, which David Harvey consid-
ers as an unintended consequence of the neoliberal revolution.82
In addition to informing their foreign policy prescriptions and interventions, 
the new neoliberal orthodoxy most notably animated public policy domesti-
cally in the US and UK from 1979. As implemented and promulgated by the 
Reagan and Thatcher governments in the US and UK respectively, it provided 
an ideological rationale for government moving away from the politics of 
social distribution towards that of the putative imperatives of economic growth. 
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Policies included deregulation, tax breaks for the wealthy, privatization, cutting 
back on public and welfare spending, floating currencies, removing tariffs and 
subsidies, curtailing the power of unions and replacing centralized award wage-
determination with flexible ‘enterprise bargaining’. Privatization extended to core 
state functions and strategic sectors such as security, defence and infrastructure, 
not to mention health, education and transport. By way of illustration, between 
1984 and 1988, the British government privatized British Telecom, British Gas, 
British Airways, the British Airport Authority and British Steel, and sold its shares 
in British Petroleum.
Yet, in the UK and US, neoliberal policies were not simply imposed, although 
they did encounter a great deal of protest, particularly from unions. The manu-
facturing of consent played an important role in sustaining otherwise polarizing 
policies, particularly amongst the middle socio-economic classes in the US and 
UK. The ideological captivation of an influential segment of the population who 
were seeing salaries and savings affected by double-digit inflation was critical: 
home ownership, private property, individualism and nationalism (stoked by the 
Falklands war in the UK, and the Cold War in the US) also inclined middle sec-
tions of the population to be more receptive to the prescriptions.83 
After 1980, financial asset growth accelerated, marking a shift from the pat-
tern of most of the twentieth century, when financial assets had for the most part 
grown at about the same pace as GDP. From 1980 to 2007, global financial assets 
such as equities, bank deposits and private and public debt nearly quadrupled 
in size relative to global GDP.84 Global capital flows similarly expanded in an 
unprecedented fashion. This growth has reflected a number of interrelated trends, 
including advances in information and communication technology, financial mar-
ket liberalization, and the growth in complex instruments in financial products 
and services. Accelerated financial deregulation and floating exchange rates ulti-
mately made the market more speculative and volatile. Susan Strange noted this 
shift to what she dubbed ‘casino capitalism’:
The speculation and the mobility of capital across frontiers meant that the 
value of any currency came to depend much more on financial flows moved 
by the moods of the market than on those moved by the balance of trade in 
the real economy.
(Susan Strange)85
US financial deregulation compelled other governments to follow suit, courtesy of 
being tied into the now global financial system as well as through imposition by 
indirect force and crisis. The predication of policy upon the ‘confidence’ of mar-
kets and private bond-rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
stemmed from the increasing and largely self-induced compulsion of states to pro-
cure finance as a result of its own diminishing tax base. States were thus pressured 
into facilitating neoliberal policies in order to realize the promise of material gains 
from neoliberal globalization. The ideology was reinforced by an echo chamber of 
management writers, private-sector think tanks and business schools. Economists at 
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institutions such as the World Bank and IMF reframed development to fit neoliberal 
prescriptions and what came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’86 
(elsewhere dubbed the ‘Wall Street–Treasury–IMF Complex’)87 with the promotion 
of austerity, floating exchange rates and a deregulated financial system billed as 
necessary to obtain and maintain credit worthiness. Established in 1995, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) became the major international institutional mechanism 
to set neoliberal rules in the world economy. New financial ideas such as microfi-
nance, originally innovated by Muhammad Yunus’s Grameen Bank, were co-opted 
and corporatized for promotion in poor countries by the World Bank and United 
Nations (UN) agencies, subsuming ‘poverty capital’ into formal circuits.88
While inaugurated by the politically right-wing administrations of Thatcher 
and Reagan in the ‘greed is good’ 1980s, neoliberal policies were consolidated by 
US Democratic (Clinton) and British Labour (Blair) administrations throughout 
the following decade. In the 1990s, globalization was increasingly presented as 
political justification for the state relinquishing control in some areas and ceding 
it to the market as a superior allocative device rather than some kinds of economic 
intervention and regulation. Neoliberal globalization was presented as the posi-
tive, progressive force and an integrative (on its own terms) inevitability, one that 
is supposedly futile and self-defeating to contest.89 By implicitly presenting the 
global, national and local scales as quintessentially the domains of capital, state 
and labour respectively; ‘top-down’, unidirectional power relationships appeared 
to be discursively – and operationally – locked in.
For all its grandiose rhetoric from its advocates about the primacy and promise 
of economic growth, global growth rates for the 1980s and 1990s fell from previ-
ous decades and averaged only 1.4 and 1.1 per cent in each decade respectively.90 
Keeping in mind that growth is not always the optimal or preferred accumulation 
strategy by dominant capital, as we have seen, the 4.9 per cent average annual rate 
of growth of global GDP during the long boom had dropped to 3 per cent in the 
period 1973–89.91 The volume of speculative capital – money chasing money – 
well and truly eclipsed the productive economy during this period. By 2006, the 
levels of extreme financialization resulted in the inflated value of financial assets 
being four times the value of GDP in the United States and Europe: 456 per cent 
of GDP in the US and 356 for the European Union (EU). Europe’s financializa-
tion has grown at a faster rate than the US, though from a lower level, with its 
compound annual growth rate in the decade between 1996 to 2006 hitting 4.4 per 
cent, in contrast with the US rate of 2.8 per cent.92
From 1973 to 1995, there were 11 major financial crises.93 Financial disasters 
in the 1990s alone included the 1994–95 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997 Asian 
crisis of economies previously dubbed ‘miracles’ of development,94 and the 1998 
Russian and Brazil crises, rounded off by the mismanagement of Barings Bank, 
the protests at and inspired by Seattle in 1999 and Prague in 2000, and the col-
lapse of Enron in the same year. The apparently greater frequency of endemic 
and systemic crises may partly reflect the assertion that they never really resolved 
but simply moved around geographically; as David Harvey asserts: ‘capital never 
solves its crisis tendencies, it merely moves them around’.95 
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Amid this, wage-workers have suffered an absolute decline in living standards 
in a number of countries. In the US, the real weekly earnings of production and 
nonsupervisory workers (in 1992 dollars) fell from $315 in 1973 to $264 in 1989, 
reaching $271 in 1999, which remained lower than the average real wage in 1962. 
Between 1980 and the early 1990s, real wages similarly fell in a number of South 
American countries: 53 per cent in Venezuela, 68 per cent in Ecuador, 14 per cent 
in Argentina, 21 per cent in Uruguay, and 73 per cent in Bolivia.96 Meanwhile, a 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report suggests that between 1998 
and 2005, roughly two thirds of all corporations operating in the US paid no taxes 
at all.97 Corporatocracy has emerged as a pejorative term against the selective hol-
lowing out of the state and the domination of politics by the interests of business 
corporations.
Toward the end of the 1990s there was a real sense that dogmatic market fun-
damentalism was being undermined in both the centres of neoliberal orthodoxy, 
the UK and the US. This was reflected in the emergence of a ‘third way’ rhetoric 
(if not in practice) between the state and the market, particularly in the UK.98 
Even ex-advocates such as George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz and John Gray were pro-
pounding the dangers of unfettered global free markets and the increasing insta-
bility and social costs of global capitalism.99 Deregulation in the UK’s agricultural 
sector, for example, likely had a direct causal impact on the outbreak of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or ‘mad cow’ disease, because the Department 
of Agriculture had cumulatively closed half of its sanitation centres.100 The effects 
of deregulation were coming back to bite.
Despite the failure of its promise of generative economic growth – recalling 
that the rate of economic growth deemed optimal for profit being at or above 3 
per cent per annum – the neoliberal revolution has however succeeded in restor-
ing dominant capital class privilege, and in fact has seen grotesque concentrations 
of wealth and power over the past three decades. A key feature of the neoliberal 
project according to Jason Moore has been to create new conditions for what he 
has called the ‘four cheaps’ and the exhaustion of a regime of accumulation can 
be read through the signals of rising prices of the Big Four inputs of energy, food, 
labour and raw materials.101 The current crisis is defined more broadly then as not 
simply one of capitalist accumulation, but of capitalism exhausting its civiliza-
tional cheap nature strategy: ‘(t)hat process of getting extra-human natures – and 
humans too – to work for very low expenditures of money and energy is the his-
tory of capitalism’s great commodity frontiers, and with it, of capitalism’s long 
waves of accumulation’.102 Labour is also becoming increasingly exhausted in its 
capacity to deliver unpaid work to capital, with declining fertility, psycho-social 
problems, the inability to ‘switch off’, and related problems.
The capitalist share of income and power is at historic highs – but does this 
also indicate it is close to an asymptote in the term Nitzan and Bichler have used? 
On their figures, the top 0.01 per cent of the wealthy had a market capitaliza-
tion to national income ratio of 100 per cent in 2010, up from 20 per cent in the 
early 1950s, and down from 160 per cent in the early 2000s; in the same period, 
the after-tax profit share of the top 0.01 per cent in national income in the US 
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increased threefold, from 2 to 6 per cent,103 nearly three times higher. If capitalists 
are structurally conditioned to increase their share even more, this would ‘require 
an avalanche of mergers and acquisitions and/or intense measures to increase dif-
ferential markups more and more – an already tall order that will grow even taller 
with every further increase in the differential size of dominant capital’.104
Internationally, US administrations have continued using the same instru-
ments such as monetary policy. Through its dollar hegemony in particular, the 
US government has continued to deftly finance its burgeoning balance of pay-
ments deficit through the global financial system, imposing the cost of its deficit 
on those who hold dollar reserves, and in effect absorbing the post-war economic 
surpluses of Japan and Germany. This situation is causing more than a small 
deal of disquiet, with increasing speculation of a currency war and moves to 
destabilize US dollar hegemony, an issue that will be briefly revisited later in 
the chapter.
Post Cold war détente: the promise of global civil society in the 1990s
A veritable associational revolution seems underway at the global level that 
may constitute as significant a social and political development of the begin-
ning of twenty-first century as the rise of the nation state was of the nine-
teenth century. 
(Lester Salamon)105
Flush from the annus mirabalis of 1989, the idea of global civil society seemed to 
gain traction in the 1990s. The events surrounding the felling of the Berlin Wall, 
the release of Nelson Mandela and the official end of the apartheid era in South 
Africa, and an apparent easing of Cold War tensions with Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
glasnost and perestroika, preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, all por-
tended a decade of greater optimism in what citizen action could achieve. This 
was bookended at the end of the decade and the start of the next by the vic-
tory of civil groups against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the 
unprecedented protests in 1999 and 2000 in Seattle, Genoa, Melbourne, Prague 
and elsewhere where the so-called ‘anti-globalization’ movement is supposed to 
have started with the ‘watershed’ 1999 Seattle WTO meeting, and a key element 
of emerging global civil society, the inaugural World Social Forum (WSF) during 
January 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. This was accompanied by the corporate col-
lapses of Enron and Worldcom and the popular uprisings in Argentina, to name a 
few key events.
In this brief consideration, I suggest that the idea of global civil society became 
attractive for a number of reasons. First, it potentially offered an alternative global 
moral vision and space to that of marketization and nationalism, or what I will 
identify as the amalgam of neoliberal-neoconservative globalism. It had a clear 
appeal to the traditional left who had historically been committed to internation-
alism and solidarity and greater equality across national borders. Second, it also 
challenged the notion that corporations had become the standard-bearer agents of 
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globalization, with aggregated citizen activity in the civil sphere not uncommonly 
overtaking membership of major political parties in older industrialized countries, 
reflecting increased dissatisfaction with traditional, national-scale formal political 
institutions and the veneer of Left–Right adversarial politics, especially as neolib-
eralism had been embraced by mainstream political parties of both left and right 
in many countries.106
With a number of civil society organizations (CSOs) astutely rejecting the reac-
tionary-framed moniker of ‘anti-globalization’, global civil society has also been 
referred to by such terms as the People’s Justice Movement, the ‘citizen sector’, 
a Movement of Movements and globalization from below, and may or may not 
include non-government organizations (NGOs) depending upon the conceptual 
basis of its definition. While a neologism of the end of the millennium, ‘civil soci-
ety’ has a longer lineage, with a long history of cosmopolitan exchange and the 
reciprocal co-constitution and interaction of local and distant events, peoples and 
places.107 By one definition, global civil society is seen as broadly encompassing 
the ‘ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks and individuals located 
between the family, the state, and the market, and operating beyond the confines 
of national societies, polities and economies’.108 John Keane characterizes global 
civil society as a ‘vast, interconnected, and multilayered non-governmental space 
that comprises many hundreds of thousands of self-directing institutions and ways 
of life that generate global effects’.109
Another neologism closely attached to civil society has been the idea of social 
capital. Advocates such as Robert Putnam have promulgated the concept as being 
critical for social cohesion and economic development. Putnam distinguishes 
between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital within and between communities 
respectively, defining social capital as ‘connections among individuals, social net-
works and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’.110 
For Putnam, social capital works with and through the market and state rather than 
replacing them111 and thus is conceived as basically compatible with, and legible 
to, the public transcript of neoliberal globalization.
Critics wary of the concept of social capital, and of the professionalization 
of social change as manifest in the proliferation of NGOs in the 1990s, have 
pointed to the amorphous meaning of the term. Ben Fine dubs social capital ‘the 
McDonaldization of social theory’ – ubiquitous, bland, homogenized and intellec-
tually un-nutritious.112 Katharine Rankin regards it as not just a politically expedi-
ent but harmful concept, pressed into service by neoliberal ideologues to cast a 
progressive veneer over the rollback of the state:
the social capital framework enables the architects of neoliberal economic 
policy to cast the reconfiguration of state-society relations in progressive 
terms – local capacity building, local self-reliance, net social benefits from 
reduced transaction costs and increased returns to human capital. As such, 
social capital can be expected to fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of 
the welfare state in countries around the world.
(Katharine Rankin)113
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The proliferation of NGOs and their insinuation into various community processes 
has similarly been regarded warily, particularly when seen to be filling the vacuum 
left by the withdrawal of the state’s social provision responsibilities. Tina Wallace 
asks whether NGOs have acted as a ‘Trojan horse of neoliberalism’, in the early 
2000s Gereffi et al. dubbed the phenomenon the ‘NGO–Industrial Complex’ and 
in 2014 a critical piece in The New York Times, by capitalist scion Peter Buffett, 
examined the ‘charitable-industrial complex’ and ‘conscience-laundering’.114
A distinction between social change NGOs and service-oriented NGOs may be 
usefully applied here: within the latter, a kind of NGO-vanguardism has developed 
among some professional campaigners according to activist Patrick Reinsborough, 
the belief that social change is best left to experienced policy wonks. As he puts it, 
‘NGOism is the conceit that intermediary organizations of paid staff, rather than 
communities organizing themselves into movements, will be enough to save the 
world’.115 In this view, ‘NGOism’ promotes complicity rather than simply coop-
tion, growing to become part of the corporatist system. One cited example is the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) lending legitimacy to oil companies by providing 
a green seal of approval.116 The involvement of celebrities and popstars such as 
Bono in corporatized campaigns such as Make Poverty History and the attempted 
reinvention of Jeffrey Sachs from a practitioner of shock therapy to a development 
guru also illustrate the cooption of genuine desire for positive political change into 
the public transcript.117
Defenders of the role of NGOs in emerging civil society might point to the 
perceived positive impacts of reforming the business sector, such as the increased 
number of transnational corporations releasing sustainability reports, from seven 
in 1990 to 487 in 2001.118 Other successes include the Nestlé and baby breast-milk 
campaign, and the growth of ethical investment and fair trade products is also seen 
as reflective of the increasing influence of CSOs.119 For the purposes of this book, 
my point is not that global civil society entities such as NGOS do not have their 
place or are not carrying out worthwhile work; it is that they have tended to have a 
limited range of actions based on reforming, civilizing, humanizing, influencing, 
adapting; and that their legibility and cooption within public transcript globaliza-
tion limits the degree to which they can offer transformatory rather than merely 
palliative possibilities from the grassroots.
Given what appeared to be global civil society’s promise throughout the 1990s, 
what then changed? Almost exactly a year prior to September 11 2001, the S11 
protesters converging in Melbourne to shut down the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) were riding high. The momentum had exploded at the 1999 Seattle WTO 
meeting, with 50,000 people converging with the aim of disrupting and shutting 
down WTO meetings. An international, web-facilitated, broad-based coalition 
across many cities and countries had formed which would continue in Prague. 
Subsequent WTO meetings were forced to implement a mini police-state around 
summits – encapsulating for many what corporate globalism is all about, with the 
freezing of civil liberties and the setting up of no free speech and no free assembly 
zones. These events and protests succeeded in putting corporate globalization on 
the public agenda and making it a subject of debate.
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The World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks effectively stymied the further 
development of this aspect of global civil society, particularly the momentum 
of the direct action protests. The September 11, 2001 attacks were exploited by 
the Bush administration to generate fear and to curb the burgeoning movement’s 
influence. This can be seen in the reductions in civil liberties and the increasing 
criminalization of resistance – terrorists and resisters were made to look the same 
and 9/11 became the answer to all questions or protestations. The extension of 
police state-like provisions could be seen in the US Patriot Act I and II, which has 
applied not only to the US but has authorized the US government to act against 
citizens of other countries as well.
Yet it may be premature and misguided to write off the concept of global civil 
society. I agree with Appadurai’s separating out of grassroots globalization and 
global civil society which he then nevertheless sees as necessarily going hand in 
hand: ‘The idea of an international civil society will have no future outside of the 
success of these efforts to globalize from below’.120 This is suggestive of the notion 
that global civil society can and should be built upon a requisite infraglobaliza-
tion that I argue should first be cultivated; I contend that global civil society will 
likely be vulnerable to being subsumed unless it nurtures informal order of forms 
illegible to corporatist power, an idea explored in the next chapter. In this respect I 
argue that the remedy to the depredations of corporate capitalism is genuine delib-
erative democracy, but that formal electoral democracy is insufficient on its own.
The empire strikes back: the ‘neo-neo’ strategic alliance and 
crisis capitalism
For globalization to work, America can’t be afraid to act like the almighty 
superpower it is . . . The hidden hand of the market will never work without 
the hidden fist – McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, 
the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for 
Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, 
Navy and Marine Corps.
(Thomas Friedman)121
Terrorism is the war of the poor, and war is the terrorism of the rich.
(Peter Ustinov)122
Throughout the 1990s, the unexpected end of the Cold War had initially pre-
cipitated triumphalism in some quarters that the West had ‘won’, exemplified 
by Francis Fukuyama’s essay, ‘The End of History’.123 The demise of the Soviet 
Union and bipolar arms race that attended the superpower rivalry also led to 
declining military expenditures in the US – and brought with it expectations of a 
peace dividend. Military spending in the US throughout the 1990s did fall, from an 
average of 4.5 per cent of GDP in the first half of the 2000s, down from 7 per cent 
in the 1980s, accompanied by a great deal of rationalization in the arms industry. 
During the 1990s according to the Budget Authority for National Defense figures 
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it declined every year except for 1999; in the 2000s it increased every year and 
only dipped slightly in 2005 and 2009. 124 With the end of the Vietnam war, the 
US government was less to underwrite US military firms through military con-
tracts and Middle Eastern oil increasingly became the new source of financing for 
the weapons trade, which from the early 1970s replaced South East Asia as the 
primary destination of global arms exports.125 The US post-war ‘permanent arms 
economy’ was maintained such that by 1990 the value of the weapons, equipment 
and factories devoted to the Department of Defense in the US was 83 per cent of 
the value of all plants and equipment in US manufacturing.126
Yet at the turn of the millennium, there was a sharp U-turn in both economic 
and policy rhetoric from ‘growth’ and ‘peace’ to ‘stagflation’ and ‘wars’.127 
(This is qualified by the recognition that in many respects the preemptive 
strikes, policies of regime change, and disregarding of international law are not 
confined to the 2000s and that US unilateralism in many respects commenced 
under the Clinton administration and prior.) The two entry points for augment-
ing neoliberalism and neoconservatism both occurred on September 11, just 
under two decades apart: 1973 in Chile and 2001 in New York. The criminaliza-
tion of the burgeoning and promising protest movement represented by Seattle 
in 1999 was enabled by the stunning effect of the events of September 11, 2001 
in New York and Washington DC, as ‘terrorists’ and protestors were made to 
look identical.128 Even before the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Centres, a shift had occurred with a constitutional coup of sorts in 2000 with the 
US Supreme Court ruling that eventually saw George W. Bush become the US 
President over rival Al Gore.129
Neoconned: the neoconservative coup 
In the lead-up to such an apparent U-turn from the 1990s, the ascendancy of the 
neoconservatives in US politics bears mentioning: I submit that neoconservatism 
can be seen as an extension of corporate globalism. A group of former Trotskyists 
who had turned to the Right during the Cold War anti-communist crusade, the 
neoconservatives had their origins in a section of the Jewish émigré intellectual 
scene in New York during the 1930s, and later joined with a number of Gentiles.130 
Neoconservatism can be summarized in six propositions:
1 a theory of history that invested the Shoah with perpetual contemporary 
significance;
2 the necessity and irreplacability of military force;
3 there are no alternatives to US global leadership;
4 a cultural politics of deference to authority;
5 crisis is a permanent condition requiring urgent action; and
6 strong statesman-like leadership is the only decisive antidote to crisis.131
The neoconservatives were also largely likudnik zionists: it was in a 1996 policy 
paper for Benjamin Netanyahu’s then incoming Likud government that the group 
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of core neoconservatives headed by Richard Perle outlined their political agenda 
via the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic Political Studies. Entitled 
‘A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, the group advised 
Netanyahu to directly challenge existing US policy, advocating a break with the 
ongoing Oslo ‘peace’ process. They explicitly encouraged strikes against Lebanon 
and Syria as a ‘prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East’ and called 
for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq. ‘Whoever inherits 
Iraq’, they wrote in a related paper, ‘dominates the entire Levant strategically’.132 
In a few years, many of the letter’s signatories would assume key or shadow posi-
tions in the Bush administration, ready to act on their recommendations.133
The broad blueprint for how to carry out these recommendations was laid out 
in a 90-page report, ‘Rebuilding America’s Defences’, published by the Project 
for the New American Century (PNAC), whose founders included future vice- 
president Dick Cheney, future defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and future 
deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Promoting US global leadership, 
according to PNAC, entailed higher military spending. The US needed a major 
‘military transformation’ – although such transformation was ‘likely to be a long 
one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbour’.134
The events in New York of September 11, 2001 tilted the policy climate toward 
the neoconservatives, giving them their ‘Pearl Harbour’ style crisis to change the 
balance of power in the administration. Hitherto marginal – they had been dubbed 
the Crazies in the first, George Bush Senior, administration135 – they success-
fully used the trauma to reorient policy. The neonconservatives waged a concerted 
campaign, both within and outside the Bush administration, to put Iraq on the 
policy table after September 11, 2001.
The readiness of the neoconservatives stood in contrast to the establishment 
realists. Their superior coordination and policy-preparedness cohered ideo-
logically and politically to overcome their more fragmented realist opposition. 
Propagating the sham evidence eventually used by the administration, the neo-
conservatives made full use of their informal and formal networks to organize 
and short-circuit policy. They succeeded in tilting US national security discourse 
in the uncertain climate of post 9/11 policy, with an echo-chamber of boosters in 
the media, academia and thinktanks reinforcing the message.136 On a deeper level, 
the neoconservatives ultimately succeeded by appealing to and appropriating the 
totems of US nationalism, tapping into the messianic Manifest Destiny view of its 
role in the world, in tune with George W. Bush’s later subsumptive proclamation 
that values the US promulgates, such as (putative) freedom, ‘are right and true for 
every person in every society’.137
The invasion of Iraq: a war for oil?
In 2002, the Bush administration announced the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive action’. 
It was eventually used to justify the invasion of a sovereign state, Iraq, on the 
pretext – since proven false – that Iraq might have been developing weapons of 
mass destruction. The doctrine of pre-emption would see the twentieth century 
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bookended by colonial brutality and Anglo-American imperial folly in Iraq, and 
conditions for a ‘colonial present’ in this and other parts of the world.138 The 
prevailing view among many, though by no means all, sections of the Left in the 
lead-up and after the invasion of Iraq was that the real reason for the war was to 
secure the physical prize of Iraq’s oil reserves.
Yet there was no evidence of Big Oil – referring to the largest oil firms – 
lobbying for the war.139 To be clear, oil is certainly a key commodity of geopoliti-
cal significance but the oil determinism argument or assumption is problematic 
and misleading. Although it is outside the purview of this book, the invasion of 
Iraq and the so-called ‘global war on terror’ was not primarily about oil or the 
physical control of resources and more about the Anglo-American-Israeli colo-
nial axis.140 That business interests such as Big Oil stepped in afterwards is more 
incidental rather than causal. In contrast to those who surmise that it must be ‘all 
about oil’ and overlook the crucial realpolitik that involves regional hegemony 
and the Israeli regime’s role, the facts are that contemporary production of oil 
in Iraq has not even reached pre-war levels.141 Additionally, George Bush Sr., 
and his Secretary of State, James Baker – both ‘oil men’ whose modus operandi 
for business profits is stability rather than civil war and the ‘Salvador Option’ – 
 deliberately avoided occupying Iraq.142
The invasion of Iraq also confounds the otherwise more convincing Disaster 
Capitalism thesis expounded by Naomi Klein, again in part because the assumed 
primacy of neoliberal ideology and business interests in the Iraq war overlooks 
the role of Israel and the Israel Lobby in the US. Dick Cheney, for example, was 
not a Friedmanite. No-bid contracts in Iraq have had more to do with corruption 
than ideological commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy and a global ‘free’ market. 
There are certainly many connections between the two but disentangling these 
two impulses avoids the erroneous assumption that war profiteers like Cheney and 
Rumsfeld were somehow dutifully committed to Friedmanite free market ideol-
ogy.143 It also makes it possible to criticize each distinctly as well as to see where 
neoliberalism was latched on to neoconservative policies.
While military hardware and materiel (military products) firms in this case 
merely capitalized upon, rather than deliberately brought about, the disaster 
in Iraq, the distinction is not always clear as Stephen Holmes notes: Lockheed 
Martin’s stock price nearly tripled between 2003 and 2007 following the chair-
ing of a committee agitating for war with Iraq by a former vice president of the 
firm.144 ‘In conflicts passed’, Arundhati Roy has quipped, ‘weapons were manu-
factured for war. Now, wars are manufactured to sell weapons’.145 If the invasions 
of Iraq and Afghanistan can be situated in the process of capital accumulation, 
how exactly do they fit?
The ‘neo-neo’ convergence
The ascendant neocons exploited the fissures between the corporate managers, the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) represented by the Business Roundtable, who 
tend to value stability and avoid risk-taking – and the new men of money, the faction 
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of capital comprising entrepreneurs who came to prominence with the administra-
tions of Nixon and Reagan. This newer faction tended to resent the establishment’s 
inherited entitlements and sense of class superiority.146 Unlike the more stability-
favouring establishment CEOs, the emergent entrepreneurs tended towards the 
economic opportunities generated from crises.147 In this way, these newer money 
men were more naturally aligned with the neoconservative philosophy. 
Apart from the economy, a loose alliance had formed between the neoconserv-
atives and liberal interventionist hawks that started with Bosnia – an intervention 
that, in the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle supported and 
Colin Powell opposed. The ‘right to interfere’, droit d’ingérence, served as the 
bridge between the neoconservatives and liberal interventionists, leading critics to 
dub the notion of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ as effectively humanitar-
ian imperialism.148 ‘In today’s America’, the late Tony Judt wrote, ‘neoconserva-
tives generate brutish policies for which liberals provide the ethical fig-leaf’.149
The compatibility of neoconnery and the neoliberal creed in what I have termed 
the neo-neo convergence is evidenced in a number of key similarities, and miti-
gated by a number of differences.150 First, neoliberalism and neoconservatism may 
well be described as the kissing cousins of contemporary post-2001 empire. It is 
no accident that the hegemonic neoliberal governments of the US and UK have 
also pursued neoconservative policies. David Harvey opines that neoconserva-
tism may make neoliberalism more governable, conferring stability through coer-
cion over the chaos of multitudinous individual interests.151 Both are not averse to 
applications of massive violence as an instrument of social and economic change, 
including but not limited to the ‘neoliberal war’ hybrid. Neoconservatives have 
advocated supply-side economics.
Yet there are also a number of contradictions. Notwithstanding ‘military 
Keynesianism’, military and economic intervention is ostensibly against the phil-
osophical position of neoliberalism, recalling that Milton Friedman was against 
even the intervention of institutions like the World Bank and IMF, although 
Friedmanite economists came to occupy some of the top positions in those insti-
tutions. Another contradiction is that the construction of a borderless world for 
corporate capital, in the neoliberal vision, ironically depends upon the prior 
deployment of territorialized state power. Putative deregulation, at least in some 
sectors, occurs amidst metaregulation in others, such as border protection and law 
and order controls. Borders are more important after 9/11, not less. The spatial 
imaginaries of neoliberalism and neoconservatism also collide: neoliberalism’s 
borderless spaces versus neoconservatism’s spaces of border discipline.
Another contradiction can be discerned in that the extraterritorial implications 
of neoliberal policy in many ways presume, and in turn define, imperial authority. 
The free market claims of those advocating less government are sharply at odds 
with the fact that it requires a set of institutional arrangements that can only be 
underwritten by statist organizations. This also speaks to the underplayed milita-
rism of the neoliberal globalization project. Domestically within the US ‘perma-
nent war economy’, there has long been a general correspondence between US 
military spending and economic growth rates throughout much of the past cen-
tury. Preparation for war and military conflict has been cited both as an economic 
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 stimulant and as an economic drain. Military spending has been an established 
fiscal tool particularly throughout the post-war years of Military Keynesianism, 
marked by NSC–68.152 It has been accepted as a legitimate form of government 
‘intervention’ by big business as well as organized labour, particularly in com-
munities around the US ‘gun belt’.153 Similarly, successive recent US administra-
tions have long been using its territorial–military power to shore up its waning 
economic power, effectively using its military power to buy time and space.154
There are also a number of qualitatively new developments. While the revolv-
ing door between intelligence agencies and private industry has continued, 
there is also the unprecedented outnumbering of public US military personnel 
by private contractors in Iraq. The creation of a disaster capitalism and home-
land security  complex – a new economy in surveillance, privatized war and 
 disaster – could be seen as an extension of the older military industrial complex.155 
Figure 2.2 ‘They’re having problems with their economy again’.
Source: Ron Cobb cartoon c.1970. © Ron Cobb All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
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Companies producing products such as hi-tech fences, unmanned drones,  biometric 
IDs, video and audio surveillance gear and services such as air passenger profil-
ing and prisoner interrogation systems are booming, but the overlap is deeper 
and more extensive, infecting even ostensibly consumer civilian goods like snack 
foods.156 In the homeland security complex there is clearly a powerful economic 
incentive to exploit fear and threats, as well as to manufacture them, from anthrax 
to bird flu and swine flu, to airport scanners. In the disaster capitalism complex, 
the hegemonic state is not just the transmission belt but also a clear engine of 
capital accumulation. In 1999–2000 there were only nine companies with federal 
homeland security contracts in the US. By 2003 it was 3,512. By 2006 there were 
33,890. Since 2000, $130 billion of contracts have been dished out.157
Globalization as empire and endgame
The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or reli-
gion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners 
often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.
(Samuel P. Huntington)158
This is another thing that empires do which too often goes unmentioned in the 
historical and political literature of countries like the United States, Britain and 
France. Empires impoverish whole populations and kill lots and lots of innocent 
people . . . The purpose of all this killing is to prevent alternative, independ-
ent, self-defining nations from emerging. So the empire uses its state power 
to gather private wealth for its investor class. And it uses its public wealth to 
shore up its state power and prevent other nations from self-developing.
(Michael Parenti)159
Since the 2000s the concept of empire has seen something of a rehabilitation. In 
2003 The New York Times Magazine ran the headline ‘American empire: get used 
to it’ on its January 5 cover. The unapologetic hubris was arguably also on display 
in 2005 when then British Treasurer told the Daily Mail: ‘the days of Britain having 
to apologize for the British empire are over. We should celebrate’.160 The concept of 
imperialism has been a mainstay in the social sciences in the last century, with the 
work of Hobson, Hilferding, Luxemburg, Kautsky, Lenin and later the Monopoly 
Capital school (Baran and Sweezy, Kalecki, Magdoff).161 In 1902 Hobson wrote:
The economic root of Imperialism is the desire of strong organized industrial and 
financial interests to secure and develop at the public expense and by the public 
force private markets for their surplus goods and their surplus capital. War, mili-
tarism and a ‘spirited foreign policy’ are the necessary means to this end.
(John A. Hobson)162
While imperialism never really went away as a key plank of US and general Western 
foreign policy, the intervening era of decolonization and liberalization belies the fact 
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that at the start of the last century, it was a respectable, legitimate policy position. US 
administrations have been responsible for bombing over 25 countries, attempting 
to overthrow over 50 governments, and have crushed over 30 popular movements 
against despotic regimes. In an oft-cited internal US State Department memoran-
dum of 1948, with particular reference to Asia, the realist George F. Kennan wrote:
We have 50 per cent of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3 per cent of its popu-
lation . . . In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resent-
ment . . . Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships 
which will allow us to maintain this position of disparity without positive det-
riment to our national security . . . We should dispense with the aspiration to 
‘be liked’ or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international 
altruism . . . We should cease to talk about vague [and] unreal objectives such 
as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The 
day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. 
The less we are hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.
(George F. Kennan)163
The collapse of the Eastern bloc has left the remaining superpower far outspend-
ing all military rivals, and has seen it extend its military presence in over 700 US 
military bases around the globe.164
The use of unimaginable violence in service of US empire has resulted in 
stupendous destruction abroad, greater tyranny at home, and heightened anxiety 
for millions around the world. There will likely be reverberations for decades to 
come. As Beatrix Campbell points out, violence is a resource in the performing of 
both neoliberalism and hegemonic masculinity (and I might add neoconservative 
policies); thus it is no coincidence that the richest country on the planet is the most 
armed and has the highest rate of incarceration, with most of the prison population 
male.165 The genocidal sanctions against Iraq over more than a decade between 
invasions saw more than a million children die and 5,000 Iraqis per month perish. 
Since the invasion and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, US military misad-
ventures have extended to additional theatres of war from Pakistan to Yemen. 
These have also effectively included green lights for the Israeli invasions of Gaza 
and Lebanon in 2006 and 2009, and again in 2014. People outside the West, who 
are more invisible and marginal in the public transcript of globalization, are more 
readily presented as expendable, as ‘unpeople’ (Mark Curtis) who can more read-
ily inhabit the ‘spaces of the exception’ (Giorgio Agamben) of permanent emer-
gency powers, the US Patriot Act and Guantanamo Bay and who haunt unreported 
atrocities courtesy of the servility of the corporate press.166 Bearing mention here 
is Gandhi’s apposite response when asked what he thought of Western civiliza-
tion. He replied that he thought it would be a good idea.
Imperial globalization has characteristics common to past imperialisms, accord-
ing to Neil Smith, with a hegemonic ‘third moment’ from the 1970s onwards involv-
ing ‘market pacification’ of the world following the first two waves marked by the 
Woodrow Wilson and FDR administrations.167 In Stuart Corbridge’s description: 
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‘The “war on terrorism” provides cover for many of the world’s remaining closed 
spaces to be opened up to market forces and American capital’.168 The difference 
however is that there may now be an endgame: Neil Smith saw the invasion of Iraq 
as the endgame of the US government’s imperial imposition of its vision of glo-
balization. US military and economic domination is culminating in a final ‘hegem-
onic fix’ of US globalism, and one that is unlikely to succeed: ‘In retrospect it may 
be that September 11 [2001] comes to stand not as the beginning of a new phase of 
American empire but as its dénouement, the beginning of the end for this particular 
moment of imperialism’.169 Notably, Smith has described the ‘war on terrorism’ as 
a ‘war to fill in the interstices of globalization’.170
In contrast with the (Thomas) Friedmanite ‘flat world’ optimism of corporate 
globalism, the global literature now seems to abound with books, websites and writ-
ing regarding impending catastrophes: we surely have more than four horsemen of 
the Apocalypse – peak oil, climate change, overpopulation, food price spikes and 
shortages, environmental degradation, financial crises, runaway pandemics and 
ecocide.171 The possible effect of peak oil on growth-predicated global capitalism, 
for example, has been the subject of speculation for its expected economic effects 
and consequences for globalization. Nitzan and Bichler foresee the prospect of 
sudden systemic collapse from just a small economic deceleration or tipping point:
Once humanity passes the threshold of peak oil, economic growth must turn 
negative – and, at that point, the assumption of ever-growing credit and debt 
breaks down. Investors suddenly realize that, looking forward, their assets 
have an inherently negative yield. And since this realization inverts the basis 
on which the whole society operates, the result is not a gradual decline but 
sudden collapse. The first to tank are the equity and debt markets; these are 
followed by mutually reinforcing reverberations and the eventual rupture of 
money, trade, investment, communications and other critical infrastructures; 
and the process is then sealed by conflict, war and die-off (as argued for 
example by Jay Hanson).
(Nitzan and Bichler)172
The incredible violence of renewed imperial capitalism cannot simply be adduced 
to a capital overaccumulation crisis. There are certainly important and complex 
cultural and political causes involved. The ‘neo-neo’ overlap has however increas-
ingly brought economic and military rationales together in new ways. One method 
has been through the pricing of oil.
New arsenals of accumulation: a tale of two capital factions? 
It is a sad world indeed where the fate of all mankind depends upon the fight 
between two competing groups within American big business. This, how-
ever, is not quite new: many far-reaching upheavals in human history started 
from a cleavage at the top of the ruling class.
(Michal Kalecki)173
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Throughout the past quarter century there has been an unambiguously tight 
 correspondence between oil prices and the global distribution of profits 
(Figure 2.4). During the stagflationary energy crisis of the early 1970s, the oil 
companies’ share of global profits, when the cost of crude petroleum shot up, was 
20 per cent: not bad for stagflationary ‘crisis’ times! Charting the course of these 
fluctuations, Nitzan and Bichler assert that as the accumulation cycle moved from 
breadth into depth accumulation, inflation fell and oil prices also fell, with the 
share of oil company profits falling to a mere 3 per cent by the end of the Clinton 
presidency, when what they call the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition of 
dominant capital prevailed.
The reversal came during the Bush administration, when breadth accumulation 
crashed, and the Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition faction of dominant capital 
switched to inflation-driven depth accumulation.174 The change in the outlook of 
dominant capital could not have happened without the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon attacks, Nitzan and Bichler assert, and their timing was uncanny:
Figure 2.3 Cartoon by Tohby Riddle.
Source: © Tohby Riddle. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Thank ~ou! 
You've saved my 
l·,festljle! 
l·,festljle! 
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The attacks came after the stock market had been punctured, after the merger 
boom had collapsed, after the neoliberal rhetoric had begun to backfire in 
‘emerging markets’, and after deflation had emerged as a threat. When the 
Twin Towers came down, the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition was 
already in tatters, its profits melting, its neoliberal vision tarnished. Dominant 
capital was finally ripe for a ‘regime change’ in the nature of differential 
accumulation, ready to accept the resurrected Weapondollar–Petrodollar 
Coalition as its new locomotive, ready to shift from ‘peace dividends’ back 
to ‘war profits’.
(Nitzan and Bichler)175 
In the intervening period when the Technodollar–Mergerdollar Coalition and 
strategies prevailed, the Weapondollar–Petrodollar coalition was regroup-
ing and rationalizing, with mergers fusing a number of the military giants.176 
Simultaneously, policy hawks and neoconservatives were busy formulating their 
blueprint for future scenarios of preemptive wars. With mergers apparently hav-
ing entered a deep freeze and corporate pricing power at historically weak levels, 
the previously pooh-poohed prospect of deflation became a fear.
Nitzan and Bichler’s findings are that every military conflict in the Middle East 
was followed by a period in which the oil companies beat the average return on 
equity as pitted against Fortune 500 profits (see Figure 2.5).
During the depth era of the 1970s and early 1980s, differential accumula-
tion was fuelled by stagflation and driven by conflict. The leading faction 
within dominant capital was the Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition of large 
armament and oil firms. In this context, the oil companies managed to beat 
the average comfortably, with only occasional setbacks which were quickly 
corrected by Middle East conflicts.
(Nitzan and Bichler)177
In Figure 2.5, the ‘danger zone’ refers to differential decumulation against the 
growth accumulation average of Fortune 500 companies. All major Middle 
East conflicts since the late 1960s, according to Nitzan and Bichler’s findings, 
were followed by a period during which the Petro-Core beat the Fortune 500 
average. ‘In this sense, and whatever their ultimate “cause”, these were all 
“energy conflicts” . . . The important thing to note here, though, is that “energy 
conflicts” have led not to higher oil profits as such, but to higher differential 
oil profits’.178
New indirect linkages, far more subtle, have now apparently been forged 
between capital accumulation and military conflicts. An update on the older idea 
of a relationship between the two, Nitzan and Bichler’s thesis in part is that wars 
spark up inflation and generate large profits. They point to the distributional con-
sequences of inflation prompted by the price of oil, which have resulted in the 
ratio of profit to wages rapidly rising by 250 per cent since 2001, bringing the 
overall share of profit in GDP to its highest level since 1929:
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The neoconservatives sent their army to the Middle East, the price of oil 
soared, and inflation – although hesitant at first – eventually started to follow. 
The distributional consequences weren’t lost on investors and workers. While 
wages remained flat, profits – particularly those earned by dominant capital – 
surged . . . The huge distributional impact of a small increase in inflation is 
symptomatic of the new order.
(Nitzan and Bichler)179
Oil companies have been major beneficiaries, but not through physical owner-
ship or even access to oil, which a number of pundits on the Left assumed was 
the real reason Iraq was invaded. The crucial link is the price of oil, rather than 
the possession of it. Prices have come to play an immensely important part in the 
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Figure 2.4 Oil prices and the global distribution of profits. Reprinted by permission.
Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘Cheap wars’, Tikkun, drawing on figures from 
Datastream with following series codes: OILINWD (integrated oil companies), TOTMKWD  
(all companies); IMF: L76AA&z@C001 (price of crude oil), L64@C111 (US CPI), article url:  
http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/20090327094921768/.
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process of accumulation: the key to profits of oil companies is not volume but 
price: physical control of the region’s oil reserves has not in itself made the oil 
companies more profitable. From the time of the oil crisis in the early 1970s, oil 
profits have become more dependent on price than output. Conflict and the threat 
of conflict tends to elevate the price of oil, increasing oil companies differential 
profits, and ‘for oil to become more expensive, the Middle East must be kept in 
‘turmoil’.180
Conflicts have now assumed a new role as ‘a turnkey mechanism for trig-
gering inflation’ according to Nitzan and Bichler.181 It is their provocative 
assertion that the ‘current shift toward war, and in particular the rekindling of 
conflict in the Middle East, is intimately connected with this new arsenal of 
accumulation’.182
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Figure 2.5 The petro-core’s differential accumulation and Middle East ‘energy conflicts’.
Source: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New imperialism or new capitalism?’, Review, 
p. 75. Reprinted by permission.
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Financialization and capital accumulation: ‘we’re all finance 
capitalists now’
United States Steel Corporation is not in the business of making steel. We’re 
in the business of making profits.
(Steel magnate David Roderick, former President of 
US Steel, now USX)183
Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!
(Karl Marx)184
Financialization has been the lynchpin of corporatist globalization since the 1980s. 
Broadly defined as the gravitational shift in economic activity from productive 
sectors to finance, it marks a form of capitalism that sees an exponential rise of 
the role of finance in the operations of corporate capital. The perennial crises 
of over-production and under-consumption have spurred increasingly aggressive 
financialization: overaccumulation is the point at which the reinvestment of 
capital produces diminishing or no returns; devaluation occurs when a market is 
flooded by capital and is saturated with products. Surpluses of devalued capital 
and labour co-exist with seemingly no way to bring them together, as Harvey 
notes:
Surplus capital and surplus labour exist side-by-side with seemingly no way 
to put them back together in the midst of immense human suffering and 
unmet needs. In midsummer of 2009, one third of the capital equipment in the 
United States stood idle, while some 17 per cent of the workforce were either 
unemployed, enforced part-timers or ‘discouraged’ workers. What could be 
more irrational than that!
(David Harvey)185
Conventionally understood, this could be resolved in one of two ways: through 
a new spatial fix or through the creation of new markets. The tension and gap 
between downward pressure on wages (and thus purchasing power) and the need 
for consumer markets was partially resolved with the rise of consumer debt and 
the burgeoning credit card industry. New markets were also created through the 
invention of new financial products that could be grouped under the description of 
‘shadow banking’: currency derivatives, credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, 
all of which have only sprung up relatively recently in the late 1980s and 1990s.
The shift from asset-based to debt-based financialization has occurred in many 
spheres: from the US dollar as the reserve currency, to the lifting of caps on 
interest rates from the 1970s, to the widespread debt peonage of households to 
mortgages and other consumer subscriptions such as cable television and mobile 
phone plans. The growth in the debt-based economy has been compounded by 
the fact that debt finance exists at both the beginning and end of the accumulation 
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cycle, fuelling both supply and demand. In other words, there has been a crisis 
both in effective demand (temporarily solved through the debt economy which 
has led to huge increases in household indebtedness) and in the financial system 
that has been managing the effective demand. Let us examine both ‘ends’ in turn.
The legalization of usury – the ‘big deregulation that precede[d] all other 
deregulations’ as Thomas Geoghegan puts it – kicked off the rounds of aggres-
sive deregulation in the 1980s. Its importance has been underplayed according to 
Geoghegan:
The problem was not that we ‘deregulated the New Deal’ but that we deregu-
lated a much older, even ancient, set of laws . . . which had existed in some 
form in every civilization from the time of the Babylonian Empire to the end 
of Jimmy Carter’s term.
(Thomas Geoghegan)186
Deregulation and anti-labour laws in the US particularly resulted in people effec-
tively trading in their ‘union cards for credit cards’.187 Coupled with this was what 
Lohmann describes as an ‘arms race’ to develop new financial techniques, starting 
in the 1970s, for commodifying uncertainty and making profit:
The relevant mode of ‘production’ was what might be called ‘quantism’: 
the material and social processes of isolating, laying claim to, objectify-
ing, simplifying, abstracting, quantifying, commensurating, pricing and re-
aggregating masses of unknowns by which derivatives were manufactured 
and financial uncertainty commodified. Computers and top mathematical tal-
ent were given free rein in greatly expanded efforts to break down, reframe, 
mathematize, diversify across, appropriate and charge rent for the future.
 (Larry Lohmann)188
The financial system bundles as many credit-card holders and mortgage-holders 
as possible into investment instruments. Bankers shed risk by selling repackaged 
loans to external investors, which also enables them to garner fees at almost every 
stage of the ‘slicing and dicing’ chain. In shedding risk, regulators then permitted 
them to make more loans – allowing more credit to be pumped into the economy, 
and creating even more bank fees.189 One of these new, specialized products was 
a financial instrument known as ‘collateralized debt obligations of asset-backed 
securities’ or CDOs, a bundle of mortgage-linked bonds, often mixed with other 
credit derivatives. Rather than being traded on the market, most were sold to 
banks’ off-balance-sheet entities such as ‘structured investment vehicles’ (SIV) – 
or simply left on the books. Novel and byzantine speculative instruments like 
derivatives increasingly escaped monitoring and regulation and other capital con-
trols, augmenting the increasingly unregulated power of finance capital.
From the corporate bank perspective, customers’ ability to make payments on 
the credit card or mortgage is less important than securing a certain number of 
these loans into ‘investment products’. The real estate boom, which had gone 
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global by the early 2000s, had seen a five-fold increase in the annual issuance of 
asset-backed securities – much of it involving repackaging of mortgage-backed 
instruments – from $532 billion in 2000 to $2.5 trillion in 2006.190 Banks were 
making inadvisable loans to customers with poor credit histories, producing a 
greater number of ‘toxic loans’ which ‘has allowed investors to reap trillion-dollar 
profits on the backs of modest-income people’.191 Banks were also lending more 
on less deposits: by the mid-2000s, the debt-deposit ratio loosened to 30 to one, 
effectively resulting in a greater amount of fictitious capital, and reflecting the 
massive growth of complex speculative instruments and the funnelling of invest-
ment towards financial speculation arbitrageurs and speculators.
Internationally, financialization was marked by the increase in financial depth 
indicators – the ratio of assets to GDP. In 2000, less than a dozen countries had 
financial assets that exceeded 350 per cent of GDP. By 2008, this figure had 
more than doubled to 25.192 Coupled with this, banks increasingly funded their 
liquidity outside their national market. About two thirds of cross-border loans 
are for maturities of less than one-year: loans of short duration are sometimes 
dubbed ‘hot money’ because they can be withdrawn more quickly if banks and 
financial intermediaries sense risk as occurred in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
By the new millennium, over 90 per cent of global foreign exchange transactions 
involved short-term speculation.193 By 2008, the fastest-growing component of 
capital flows has been cross-border lending and deposits, increasing from $900 
billion in 2002 to $6 trillion.194
The spread of financialization has also been driven by footloose speculative 
capital taking advantage of differentials in interest and foreign exchange rates 
in different capital markets. By way of illustration, hedging is the activity that 
describes the arbitrage involved in making a profit from exploiting differential 
prices, such as buying on the New York Stock Exchange to resell elsewhere at a 
better price. Hedged transactions can realize profits with virtually no risk, exploit-
ing gaps and spatial-temporal and legal differences in the market. Armed with 
market knowledge, IT systems and lawyers, traders are employed to spot these 
anomalies in what are increasingly complex markets, and to exploit them for 
profit. In recent years, high frequency automated trading or ‘mechanical arbi-
trage’ has even seen traders set up business outside of the hubs of London, New 
York and Tokyo to places like Siberia and locations in central Africa. Because 
trade depends upon speed, the most optimal locations to exploit even millisec-
ond fluctuations, scattered across the globe, are often those between two major 
exchanges.195
The subprime mortgage crisis punctured this situation. The limits of specu-
lative finance are that it boils down to trying to squeeze more value out of an 
already created value instead of creating new value, which is precluded by over-
production. This can only work for so long before the bubble bursts on such 
things as overvalued subprime mortgages and a correction is enforced. As Saskia 
Sassen notes, ‘The financializing of more and more economic sectors since the 
1980s has become both a sign of the power of this financial logic and the sign of 
its auto-exhaustion’. Nitzan and Bichler also express the limits of this financial 
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logic: ‘from the viewpoint of the leading corporations, most of the redistributional 
processes – from the aggregate to the disaggregate – are close to being 
exhausted’.196 When all else has been extracted and financialized, there is only 
one other source, Sassen surmizes: ‘When everything has become financialized, 
finance can no longer extract value. It needs non-financialized sectors to build 
on. The last frontier is taxpayers’ money – which is real, old-fashioned, not (yet) 
financialized money’.197 The public purse was duly targeted in the financial ‘bail-
out’ that followed, made possible by the financial oligarchy that has captured US 
politics.198
It is worthwhile noting that the most current wave of financialization signifi-
cantly reverses the experience of much past political-economic history, as Sweezy 
observed in 1994 (emphasis added):
I said that this financial superstructure has been the creation of the last two 
decades. This means that its emergence was roughly contemporaneous with 
the return of stagnation in the 1970s. But doesn’t this fly in the face of all pre-
vious experience? Traditionally financial expansion has gone hand-in-hand 
with prosperity in the real economy. Is it really possible that this is no longer 
true, that now in the late twentieth century the opposite is more nearly the 
case: in other words, that now financial expansion feeds not on a healthy real 
economy but on a stagnant one? The answer to this question, I think, is yes it 
is possible, and it has been happening.
(Paul M. Sweezy)199
Global financial crisis: the end of corporate capitalism, or its 
consolidation? 
Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that the current crisis is in the strict-
est sense a crisis of globalization, fostered and transmitted by the rapid and 
deep integration of very different economies. Fast-growing developing coun-
tries with underdeveloped financial systems were exporting savings to the 
developed world for packaging and re-export to them in the form of financial 
products.
(McKinsey Global Institute)200
A global financial crisis erupted in the middle of 2007 and escalated in September 
of 2008, precipitating an economic recession throughout much of the industrial-
ized world. The financial crisis and worldwide recession had only just halted and 
put in limbo an almost 30 year expansion of global capital markets. The financial 
crisis was triggered by the bursting of the US housing bubble, leading to a fall in 
consumer spending and mushrooming into a broader financial crisis and raising 
questions about the future of globalized finance. The crisis spread in part due to 
the pivotal role played by US consumer spending as the ‘consumer of last resort’ 
and financial assets in global capitalism. Given the complexity and opacity of 
modern finance, and the fact that bubbles are not anomalous to capital markets, 
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was it a crisis in or of the system? The financial crisis of 2008 may have helped to 
quash the myth – but not the ideology – of neoliberalism, leading to what many 
 observers started characterizing as ‘zombie’ tenets, such as ‘zombie economics’ 
(John Quiggan) and ‘zombie neoliberalism’ (Jamie Peck) where the ‘living dead 
of the free-market revolution continue to walk the earth’.201 The crisis also brought 
into sharper relief the connection between urbanization and macro- economic 
development, including ‘mutations’ described as ‘austerity urbanism’.202
As overaccumulation becomes global, markets have to internalize demand, in 
part through new markets based on credit, debt and complex financialization. The 
creation of fictitious markets like derivatives on derivatives and carbon trading 
cannot however last, nor are toxic loans sustainable. By mid-2007, defaults had 
started to rise on US subprime mortgages. Somewhat perversely, this may have 
partly come as a result of the manipulation of measures ostensibly designed to 
enhance transparency: as James C. Scott notes, bond rating agencies had made 
their rating formulas available to investment firms. With these procedures in 
mind – and in some cases even directly hiring the raters, investment firms were 
able to ‘fix’ the system by reverse-engineering bonds with the formulas, achiev-
ing top AAA ratings for exceptionally risky financial instruments.203 In the midst 
of the crisis, agencies such as Standard & Poor’s cut ratings for mortgage-linked 
products and admitted that their models were malfunctioning. The admission sent 
shockwaves and caused money market fund investors to stop purchasing notes 
issued by shadowy ‘off-balance-sheet’ vehicles such as SIVs. Fear and disorienta-
tion began to infect ‘real’ banks, which investors came to realize were exposed to 
SIVs in unexpected ways.204
While financial assets dropped by an unprecedented 8 per cent (by $16 trillion 
in 2008 to $178 trillion), most types of capital flows actually reversed, and fell 
by more than 80 per cent.205 The average government deficit in OECD countries 
rose to almost 8 per cent of GDP, and in the US, it reached 12 per cent.206 The 
steep drop-off in cross-border capital flows included foreign direct investment, 
purchases and sales of foreign equities and debt securities, and cross-border lend-
ing and deposits as foreign assets were sold by investors, companies, and banks 
and other financial institutions, who brought their money back to their home 
countries.207
By the middle of 2008, the sub-prime mortgage crisis had led to the demise of 
major Wall Street investment banks, either through change of status or through 
forced mergers, and the outright bankruptcy of Lehman that triggered a world-
wide collapse of confidence in financial institutions. The contagion then spread 
outwards from banking to the major holders of mortgage debt (Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) along with insurance giants like AIG, hitting the rest of the economy 
towards the end of 2008. By early 2009 the export-led industrialization model 
that had generated such spectacular growth in East and South East Asia was also 
contracting; and many stalwarts of US capitalism, such as General Motors, were 
close to bankruptcy.
In housing, the bubble had burst. There had been rapid appreciation in house 
prices in a number of countries, even those outside ‘mature markets’ such as 
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South Africa, where the price values of houses more than doubled between 2000 
and 2007.208 Of the more than seven million home loans in the US currently going 
unpaid, 2,055,000 have already commenced foreclosure proceedings, leading 
to widespread tent cities and ‘financial Katrinas’ in many cities of the United 
States.209 ‘The US may have been one of the principal motors of neoliberal glo-
balization’, Gary Younge notes, ‘but its citizens are also its victims’.210
The countries that averted the worst of the housing-led financial crisis were 
those where there was massive infrastructural investment, such as in increasingly 
urban China – which has accounted for 50 per cent of the world’s cement supplies 
in the last five years for its urban boom, for example, and with positive knock-on 
effects for economies supplying it such as Australia and Chile.211 The crisis cas-
caded throughout OICs but China and India were not as affected, most notably, 
because their economies had not integrated their financial systems into the global 
financial network. The crisis did however adversely affect food markets; driven 
by the commodities bubble, food prices soared, forcing an estimated 100 million 
people into hunger and sparking food riots throughout the world.212 The crisis was 
one of corporate profitability, but the costs were not primarily (or at all) borne by 
dominant capital.
The excessive power of too-lightly regulated finance capital was only com-
pounded by the large-scale economic ‘bail-out’ interventions of governments in 
various stimulus packages as a response to the financial crisis. The fiscal stimulus 
Figure 2.6 Cartoon by Agim Sulaj. © Reprinted by permission.
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seemed to come out of the Keynesian deficit economy playbook, with General 
Motors dubbed ‘Government Motors’, but it was overt ‘aidez-faire’ corporate 
welfare to Wall Street rather than providing any direct relief to Main Street. 
Aided by big finance-friendly appointees in the Obama administration, includ-
ing Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Larry Summers, firms that became 
symbols of the financial excesses and venality of corporate vulture economics 
enjoyed an implicit government guarantee on the grounds of being ‘too big to 
fail’.
Following the AIG bailout, ex-Goldman Sachs CEO and architect of the bailout 
Paulson announced a US federal bailout for the financial industry: the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP), which involved a $700 billion plan. In order to 
qualify for bailout monies, the two large remaining Wall Street investment banks 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted from investment banks to bank-
holding companies, a move that allowed them access not only to billions in TARP 
funds, but to lending from the discount window of the Federal Reserve and pub-
licly-backed funding.213 Yet this was publicly described as the banks ostensibly 
desiring to be ‘subject to far greater regulation’!214
TARP has been one of the largest transfers of wealth in modern history. With 
taxpayers’ money the last frontier for extraction, it constituted a ‘five-fingered’ 
resolution to the latest ‘crisis’ (or creordering project for redistributional gain, to 
use Bichler and Nitzan’s ‘creorder’ term). For some observers, it was capital re-
accumulation by corporate theft, recalling the saying that ‘the best way to rob a 
bank is to own one’. Journalist Matt Taibbi called TARP a ‘giant-scale financial 
fraud’ and swindle;215 David Harvey described it as a ‘financial coup, against 
the government and the population of the US’ and a ‘massive consolidation of 
financial power’.216 Finance capital has increasingly supplemented – and some-
times supplanted – accumulation through production with ‘accumulation through 
dispossession’.217
By stepping in to bail out, governments entrenched the ‘privatization of profit, 
socialization of debt’ dynamic that encouraged banks to continue taking the same 
risks that created the crisis. As Saskia Sassen notes, ‘even within a capitalist logic, 
giving more funds to the financial sector in order to solve the financial “crisis” is 
not going to work – for it would just deepen the vortex of financializing econo-
mies’.218 In other words, extreme financialization is the problem, and more of it is 
not the solution. Sassen sees an endgame to financialization:
every time governments (that is, citizens and taxpayers) have bailed out the 
financial system since the first crisis of this phase – the New York stock-
market crash of 1987 – they have given finance the instruments to continue its 
leveraging stampede. There have been five bailouts since the 1980s; on each 
occasion, taxpayers’ money was used to pump liquidity into the financial 
system, and each time, finance used it to leverage. This time, the end of the 
cornucopia is near – we have run out of money to meet the enormous needs 
of the financial system.
 (Saskia Sassen)219
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The view of a finance-led crisis of excesses has also been challenged. Nitzan and 
Bichler see as misleading the scenario whereby a distorted bubble of fictitious 
capital in the housing sector moved to the inflated wider financial market and the 
rest of the economy. A ‘distortion’ presupposes that ‘real’ value can be measured. 
There is a mismatch myth – the discrepancy between nominal finance (fictitious 
capital) and the ‘real’, productive economy – because the real economy is not 
amenable to direct measurement either: market values, reflected in price, cannot 
measure intangible assets such as technology directly:
The economists would have the laity believe that the ‘real thing’ is the tangi-
ble quantities of production, consumption, knowledge and the capital stock, 
and that the nominal world merely reflects this ‘reality’ with unfortunate dis-
tortions. This view . . . has nothing to do with the reality of accumulation. 
For the capitalists, the only real thing is nominal capitalization, and what lies 
behind this capitalization is not the production cost or productivity of capital 
goods, but the fist of capitalist power.
(Nitzan and Bichler)220
Notwithstanding this possibility, these systemic profitability crises now seem to 
be instrumental to capitalist reproduction rather than anomalous to accumulation. 
In 2009 the top hedge fund managers had their third-best year on record; in his 
own words, George Soros was ‘having a very good crisis’, and Goldman Sachs 
staff raked in the largest bonus payouts in the firm’s 140-year history.221 ‘Simply 
put’, Bichler and Nitzan state, ‘US capitalists are not worried about the crisis; they 
love it’.222 In the heart of empire, US-based dominant capital was also uniquely 
cushioned and enjoying an extended systemic privilege, albeit increasingly under 
challenge, based on US dollar hegemony.
Dollar hegemony and currency wars: new global configurations? 
Finance is the new form of warfare . . . It is a competition in credit crea-
tion to buy foreign resources, real estate, public and privatized infrastruc-
ture, bonds and corporate stock ownership. Who needs an army when you 
can obtain the usual objective (monetary wealth and asset appropria-
tion) simply by financial means? . . . Victory in today’s monetary warfare 
promises to go to whatever economy’s banking system can create the most 
credit. Computer keyboards are today’s army appropriating the world’s 
resources.
(Michael Hudson)223
An ‘exorbitant privilege’ accrues to the issuer of the major international currency, 
such that, as Richard Portes notes, then US Treasury Secretary John Connally could 
openly state in 1971: ‘The dollar is our currency, but your problem’.224 Notably, 
John Maynard Keynes’ proposal for a neutral global currency was rejected by US 
government representatives at Bretton Woods in 1944, and the replacement of the 
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asset-based gold standard with dollar-denominated and debt-based US Treasury 
bills transformed the global financial system. Michael Hudson notes:
The Treasury-bill standard effectively made the United States immune from 
the usual balance-of-payments and financial constraints, enabling its capi-
tal markets to become more highly debt-leveraged and ‘innovative’. It also 
enabled the US Government to wage foreign policy and military campaigns 
without much regard for the balance of payments.
 (Michael Hudson)225
If capital accumulation is once again at an historical inflexion point, as David 
Harvey suggests,226 it comes as a process that includes the US dollar as the 
world’s reserve currency increasingly being brought under question. If capital is 
a symbolic quantification of power, does this portend a hegemonic shift towards 
new global power configurations, such as the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS) bloc? Is the world moving away from mono- 
imperialism and the hegemonic decline of an overextended US empire?
The US is still the ‘controlling shareholder in global capitalism’.227 Current 
indicators suggest the ‘Americanization of global capital’ might still be a better 
descriptor than the ‘globalization of capital’, as US structural power has globalized 
and increased with globalization.228 This is evidenced in a host of indicators; US 
ownership accounts for almost half (46 per cent) the world’s top 500 corporations, 
and US firms make up 18 of the 25 broad sectors of the top 2000 corporations in 
the world.229 When in August 2011 the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s 
stripped US sovereign debt from its top-tier triple-A rating and downgraded it to 
AA+, investors continued buying up US government debt, simply because there 
is no comparable asset. Neither China nor Japan have this Treasury bill (T-bill) 
privilege nor the density of interlinkages with other countries and firms. As Starr 
argues, indicators that held true in the era of national capital are less relevant 
or no longer hold in an era of global capital.230 As seen in Table 2.5, US-based 
financial services and banks rebounded after the Global Financial Crisis. US debt-
driven consumerism has contributed to US growth rates, enabled by large sup-
plies of credit from China and East Asia which in turns maintains the demand for 
its export-oriented industrial sector based on cheap labour. China, East Asia and 
Saudi Arabia in particular are still effectively subsidizing US debt, much of which 
is military as Michael Hudson argues:
Growth in central bank reserves and sovereign-country funds has taken the 
form of recycling of dollar inflows into new purchases of US Treasury securi-
ties – thereby making foreign central banks (and taxpayers) responsible for 
financing most of the US federal budget deficit. The fact that this deficit is 
largely military in nature – for purposes that many foreign voters oppose – 
makes this lock-in particularly galling. So it hardly is surprising that foreign 
countries are seeking an alternative financial system.
 (Michael Hudson)231
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In this currency battle, a number of countries are attempting to make a transition 
away from the US dollar and diversify toward trade denominated in a basket of 
other currencies, as well as investing in the establishment of alternative develop-
ment banks.232 Yet the stewards of the US economy still have monetary policy at 
their disposal. One Financial Times observer, Martin Wolf, has already called the 
battle in favour of the existing hegemon:
To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter 
is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: 
there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs 
to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in 
nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.
 (Martin Wolf)233
Hegemonic transitions are epochal and infrequent. They happen gradually and 
usually carry a large range of repercussions, bringing with them uncertainty and 
instability. The extent to which we may be witnessing significant ruptures in first 
world-dominated globalization with ‘Chindia’, the BRICS, and the possible emer-
gence of regional configurations and shifts of power particularly but not exclusively 
towards East Asia is a matter of debate. The question of whether the US has had its 
‘unipolar moment’ has also gone through something of a series of see-saw phases. 
In the first half of the 2000s the US-centred empire literature reflected the lead-up 
to and aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respec-
tively.234 Yet within a decade, the rise of the BRICS and the Global Financial Crisis 
saw declinism make a return, recalling Paul Kennedy’s imperial overstretch thesis 
in the late 1980s.235 In the declinist debate, many of the same themes from the 1970s 
and 1980s featured, with Iraq replacing Vietnam and the rise of China replacing the 
rise of Japan as signalling a possible shift of economic power eastward.236
An increasingly independent (from the US) Latin America has rejected the neo-
liberal doctrine, and current cooperative efforts both intra-regionally and outside 
the region recall the historical Latin American-led push for the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s and 1980s. For the first time since the prom-
ulgation of the Monroe doctrine, Latin America is breaking free. The BRICS coun-
tries are increasingly contributing to a possibly parallel system: China has brokered 
deals with Russia, Turkey and Brazil to start direct trading without the US dollar, 
between the yuan and ruble, lira and real respectively, for example.237 NATO’s 
rival organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), linking Russia, 
China and the Central Asian Republics, might become a potential counterbalance to 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially given past US and Israeli 
administration sabre-rattling against Iran. Iran’s 2008 application for full member-
ship of the SCO was prevented by UN sanctions, although it has observer status.
Amid these broad-brush geopolitical movements, the ascent of China stands 
out unmistakably. China’s financial markets are now the world’s third largest 
after the US and Japan. Also the world’s biggest creditor (the US is still the 
world’s biggest debtor), China briefly surpassed US banks in the top 10 list of 
the world’s largest banks in terms of capitalization. Table 2.5 shows the short-run 
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dominance of Chinese banks after the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis before US 
banks rebounded by 2014. The temporary surge reflects the fact the Chinese gov-
ernment had the second largest economic stimulus in the world after the crisis, 
channeled largely through its banks.238 That China’s ascendancy occurs in a glo-
balizing era conditions the nature of its rise in very different ways from the earlier 
ascendancy of the US in a national era. Despite China being the largest electronics 
exporter in the world for nearly a decade, for example, over 90 per cent of China’s 
high-technology exports are by foreign, not Chinese, firms.239 The slowing of 
rural-to-urban migration and rising wages means China may not be able to sustain 
its high industrial growth rates based on these factors.240
Germany also offers something of an alternative economic and political tem-
plate to that of the US. It has, for example, the most social democratic ground-
up worker participation of any European country, which has coexisted with its 
remarkable export figures, and has probably contributed to them. Geoghagen 
lauds Germany’s creation of a high-wage, unionized economy, which it has 
achieved without shipping all its jobs abroad or creating a massive trade deficit. 
In Germany, the economic recession was managed by putting into place kurzar-
beit or the short workweek program, with the German government paying people 
to stay on the job when they otherwise might have been let go by companies.241 
In what would be harder to imagine occurring in the US, at least in contemporary 
times, a number of Germany’s rich also recently petitioned for higher taxes for 
the wealthy to help fund social and economic programmes to bolster Germany’s 
economic recovery.242 This is an implicit recognition of the important role of 
collective consumption, to use Manuel Castell’s phrase,243 in maintaining the 
economy and recycling the surplus, and stands in marked contrast to the manage-
ment of class cleavages through force and physical separation, such as in gated 
communities.
In aggregate, EU states produce nearly a third of the world’s economy, which 
is almost equivalent to the US and China combined. The EU has more Fortune 
500 companies than either the US, China or Japan and is less energy profligate 
than the US. Some are more sanguine about Europe (Thomas Geoghegan) than 
others (David Harvey, who sees the EU as very neoliberal). Geoghegan makes an 
interesting connection between those European countries that followed the eco-
nomic US model and supported the invasion of Iraq, and their current economic 
misfortunes:
People in the countries that are in trouble now economically were the ones 
willing to go to Iraq – and there is a connection. These are the countries that 
were much more inclined to go the American route, going into debt heavily, 
using housing speculation as the engine of the economy, and opening their 
economies big time to global bank debt and finance.
Goldman Sachs poured tons of money into Greece, and other New York, 
London and German banks poured money into Spain. None of the bubbles 
occurred in Germany and in the ‘old Europe’ that Donald Rumsfeld wrote 
off. Part of Europe is in trouble to the extent – and only to the extent – that 
 Corporatist globalization 71
it’s involved in the American model. Those countries most resistant to the 
American model are doing fine.
(Thomas Geoghegan)244
Despite these emerging configurations, the problem of effective demand remains. 
The capitalist economic system has historically expanded at a 2.5 per cent compound 
rate, and optimal compound growth is currently defined at 3 per cent. At a global 
scale, is 3 per cent compound growth possible or feasible? As David Harvey asks, 
‘What spaces are left in the global economy for new spatial fixes for capital sur-
plus absorption?’245 Financial assets in emerging markets – mostly in emerging Asia, 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa – constituted only 20 per 
cent of the global total, but accounted for almost 50 per cent of the global growth.246 
China has been the big standout, with the financial asset growth rates of other BRICS 
countries also recording growth rates of 20 per cent or more annually from 2003 to 
2008.247 Emerging markets commonly have higher GDP growth rates, infrastructure 
investment requirements and high savings rates. A McKinsey report hints that there 
are still untapped markets for capital among the populations of ‘emerging markets’:
Bank deposits also constitute an asset class with enormous growth potential 
in the developing world, where large swaths of the population have no bank 
accounts. McKinsey estimates that in emerging markets, there are 2.8 billion 
adults with discretionary income who are not part of the formal financial system.
(McKinsey Global Institute)248
As more financial capital is being raised outside of the financial hubs of New 
York, London and Tokyo, we may eventually see a re-orienting of the world 
economy towards a more multi-polar system in the longer-term, where the centre 
of economic gravity will shift towards the East. This is also where the major-
ity of the world’s poor are located, and where solutions to unconscionable post-
scarcity poverty and to the system failure (or profitable deliberate maintenance) 
of reversed capital flows through still crippling Third World debt may yet be 
addressed. Proposals such as a Tobin-style tax may be developed (as ATTAC 
have advocated, and similarly by Thomas Piketty),249 or a deeper, more systemic 
challenging of the imperative of endless compound growth may yet emerge. For 
China’s contemporary embrace of (state) capitalism, dynastic China was also the 
place where the merchant class was kept in its place.
Outlook – peak appropriation?
In place of the converging crises model, we may instead view our era’s turbu-
lence as a singular crisis – of capitalism as a way of organizing nature – with 
manifold expressions. Food and climate, finance and energy represent not 
multiple, but manifold, forms of crisis emanating from a singular civiliza-
tional project: the capitalist world-ecology.
(Jason W. Moore)250
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Corporatism often functions to paralyze transformative progressive political 
agency and effect a kind of fatalism and apathy. Jamie Swift thinks of neoliberal 
globalization as a ‘necessary myth because it provokes a sense of political paraly-
sis among those who might otherwise imagine alternatives to an unstable world 
economy dominated by currency speculators and transnational capital’.251 The 
attempt to shoehorn global activists into the local scale while corporatists colonize 
the global scale by dubbing movements and activists ‘anti-globalization’ has been 
one past strategy. Another has been to label all groups who oppose ostensibly 
‘free’ trade agreements (corporatist par excellence) as backward and protectionist. 
Of course, arguments against ‘free’ trade do not automatically amount to advo-
cacy of protectionism, merely to the fact that there are other and more equitable 
and sustainable ways to conduct trade across various borders.252
Will corporatism, driven by extreme financialization and underpinned by vio-
lence, reach its asymptotic limit and undermine itself as a mode of accumulation-
cum-governance? We recall that Bichler and Nitzan invoke the mathematical term 
asymptote to denote a ceiling or limit that is approached but never quite reached.253 
Asymptotes correspond with the last four major historical ‘bear’ markets they 
have identified, including the current and ongoing crisis that they identify as hav-
ing started in 2000 rather than 2008.254 Jason Moore also identifies the faltering 
of neoliberalism’s strategies for reducing the Big Four input prices started at least 
five years prior to the global financial crisis of 2008.255 At the current juncture, 
accompanied by the deepening of commodity relations in the sphere of reproduc-
tion, the shift towards financialization ‘has been a powerful way of postponing the 
inevitable blowback of modernity’s cheap nature strategy’.256
Despite the ongoing crisis, the power of dominant capital has increased and 
remains at record levels. Herein lies the paradox of greater power – the more you 
have, the harder it is to keep, and increase. While the corporate tax rate in the US 
was reduced from 55 to 20 per cent in the last century, owners were able to boost 
their after-tax profit by 78 per cent.257 This stunning success also makes dominant 
capital vulnerable and undercuts their continued viability however, particularly as 
‘the patterns suggest that dominant capitalists now realize that their record profit-
share-read-power has become unsustainable, hence the decade-long collapse of 
their forward-looking capitalization’.258 Bichler and Nitzan speculate:
Capitalist power rarely if ever reaches its upper limit . . . however, the closer 
capitalist power gets to its limit, the greater the resistance it elicits; the greater 
the resistance, the more difficult it is for those who hold power to increase 
it further; the more difficult it is to increase power, the greater the need for 
even more force and sabotage; and the more force and sabotage, the higher 
the likelihood of a serious backlash, followed by a decline or even disintegra-
tion of power.
(Bichler and Nitzan)259 
This is reflected in unprecedented levels of inequality which in the US is currently 
at its highest, and rivals Russia and Iran.260 In a memo to ‘my fellow zillionaires’, 
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a self-identified member of the plutocracy Nick Hanauer, warns of pitchforks if 
inequality continues unchecked:
. . . the problem isn’t that we have inequality. Some inequality is intrinsic to 
any high-functioning capitalist economy. The problem is that inequality is at 
historically high levels and getting worse every day. Our country is rapidly 
becoming less a capitalist society and more a feudal society. Unless our poli-
cies change dramatically, the middle class will disappear, and we will be back 
to late 18th-century France. Before the revolution.
(Nick Hanauer)261
Leading capitalists, reading the signs, have been struck by systemic fear: ‘Peering 
into the future, they realize that the only way to further increase their distribu-
tional power is to apply an even greater dose of violence’.262 Heikki Patomäki 
also foresees greater pain in a platter of scenarios: ‘If the “recovery followed by 
neoliberal business-as-usual” scenario proves right, the underlying super-bubble 
that has already lasted for three decades will continue to grow, gradually cre-
ating conditions for an even bigger crash in the late 2010s or early 2020s’.263 
Globalization as endgame may involve a closing of the current capitalist accumu-
lation frontier-regime in a potentially asymptotic situation, which may or may not 
also be compounded by the various peaks and the effects of climate change. As 
we have seen at the outset of the chapter, what Moore characterizes as the declin-
ing ecological surplus represents the contraction of dominant capital’s oppor-
tunities to appropriate unpaid work: ‘The “peak” that capitalism cares about is 
peak appropriation: the moment when the contribution of unpaid work is highest, 
relative to the abstract social labour (capital) deployed’.264
Put simply, the Great Frontier that opened the capitalist epoch did so by mak-
ing nature’s free gifts – human natures’ too – more or less cheaply available 
to those with capital and power. The end of the frontier today is the end of 
nature’s free gifts, and with it, the end of capitalism’s free ride.
(Jason W. Moore)265 
Wider afield, this may also be reflected in the scramble to clinch monopoly prop-
erty rights and the buying up of huge swathes of fertile arable land in Africa that 
has been described by Massimo De Angelis as ‘new enclosures’ and James Boyle 
as ‘the second enclosure movement’.266
The intensification of two forms of labour sabotage, unemployment and penal-
ity, can be seen as movements by dominant capital pushing against its class limits. 
This is reflected in the fact the correctional population in the US is over seven 
million, with two million inmates and five million more on probation or parole.267 
The criminalization of poverty such as the reappearance of debt prisons is coupled 
with the normalization of precarious, contingent labour, or what Guy Standing has 
dubbed the precariat.268 We can attempt to extrapolate current trends that suggest 
continued rising inequality in income and political influence, and the concern 
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with inequality has in many respects been mainstreamed, from Joseph Stiglitz 
to Wilkinson and Pickett to Thomas Piketty.269 The visibility of these develop-
ments has also influenced the widespread positive reaction to the Occupy move-
ment, inspired by its ongoing South European and South American movement 
precursors.
People versus plutocracy
The system ain’t broke. It’s fixed.
(An Occupy slogan)
The late 2000s and 2010s has seen unprecedented action contesting both state 
and market corporatist structures and practices, particularly as a response to the 
wave of austerity measures rolled out by Western governments as part of the 
2008 global financial crisis, such as in Spain, Greece, Iceland and the US state of 
Wisconsin; as well as its attendant crises in the majority world, such as the spikes 
in food prices in Egypt, Indonesia, parts of Africa and elsewhere; and has resulted 
in the toppling of authoritarian state regimes in the ‘Arab Spring’ (Tunisia, Egypt), 
although with varying aftermaths. Juan Cole foresees a long gestation period for 
promising Arab millennials – those born roughly around 1980 to 2000: ‘Two or 
three decades from now, the twenty-somethings of Tahrir Square or the Casbah 
in Tunis or Martyrs’ Square in Tripoli will, like the Havels of the Middle East, 
come to power as politicians’.270 These are but a small sample of the multiple 
global protest movements which have focused on economic and social inequality, 
precarity and corporate power. Since October 2011, almost a thousand cities in 
over 80 countries have started Occupy movements.271
Drawing inspiration from the protests that characterized the Arab Spring 
and the Indignados (the ‘outraged’) movement in Spain and elsewhere in south-
ern Europe, the progressive populism of the Occupy movement that started in 
September–October 2011 has seen a form of political contestation involving 
gathering near or occupying sites of iconic public power, such as Wall Street, in 
improvised camps situated in symbolic and public spaces. From Tahrir Square in 
Cairo to the privately-run public Zuccotti Park in New York, the occupation of 
public space as an act of political resistance has been significant. Initially con-
voked via magazines (Adbusters) or social media, Occupy has been an acephalous 
movement with mass appeal, pitched to the majority 99 per cent of the population 
who do not hold extreme wealth.
In the month following the occupation of Zuccotti Park in September 2011, a 
series of demonstrations were held in cities across Europe, particularly in coun-
tries especially affected by austerity such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Iceland. 
Significantly, Occupy protests also occurred in places where there was an absence 
of extreme austerity, such as Berlin in October, where up to 10,000 people par-
ticipated in the Occupy demonstration on October 15. The Occupy movement’s 
eschewal of concrete demands may denote a recognition that the movement was 
and has been about more than single issues that could be expediently addressed 
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by quick-fix legislation. Pickerill and Krinsky also state that Occupy’s absence 
of specific demands can be interpreted as a refusal to ‘recognize the legitimacy 
of the state as an agent capable of or willing to implement policy’.272 Given that 
tear-gassing and beating of unarmed protested and campers were not uncommon, 
that intuition may well have been a prudent strategic choice. In 2012 the extent of 
the crack-down collusion between state and market corporatist structures became 
clearer: the US non-profit organization Partnership for Civil Justice Fund filed a 
Freedom of Information (FoI) request that revealed that there was a coordinated 
network to crack-down on Occupy protesters, involving the US Department of 
Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and police. Banks, 
campus police and university administrations closely partnered with the FBI to 
funnel and collect information about protesters.273
Looking at the glass half-full, Lawrence Cox sees a legitimation crisis in which 
large parts of the globe are not only protesting but have actually broken free from 
neoliberalism’s ideological grip:
The Zapatistas have held their territory for some 16 years. The Northern anti-
capitalist movement is now some 11 years old, and has not retreated in the 
face of the turn to warfare and criminalization; rather, the ‘leaders of the free 
world’ remain in hiding at their regular summits. On a larger scale, the ‘New 
World Order’ has both lost control of large parts of South America, tradition-
ally the US’s backyard, as well as facing severe problems with European 
and Muslim allies alike in its Middle Eastern wars. The past decade has seen 
warfare as a way of life, neoliberal capitalism and ecologically destructive 
policies – all central movement targets – suffer massive losses in terms of 
popular consent.
(Lawrence Cox)274
In addressing this legitimation crisis, the challenge may well be to transform the 
Indignados to instaurators, a proposition that will be examined in greater detail in 
the next chapter.
Conclusion
In the public transcript projection of globalization examined in this chapter, people 
and alternatives have been placed on the putative margins of the framed-as-global, 
corporatist economy. This projection arrays a violent and hierarchical worldview 
that subsumes space and social processes into a singularist command and control 
ontology. The implicit acceptance of this projection even by critics who crucially 
leave unchallenged its perceived dominance means that subversion often fails or 
can be co-opted when it is forced into an oppositional stance. Representation mat-
ters in the way a singular representation of global reality stymies the radical heter-
ogeneity of possibilities. For more than three decades, there has been a concerted 
effort to reconstitute not just the globalized capitalist economy but to re-shape the 
whole social structure of governance and process of accumulation. Neoliberalism 
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has been an orthodoxy disproven as an intellectual project by real events. In its 
more recent policy adaptations, I have argued in this chapter, neoliberal capitalist 
orthodoxy seems to have merged with the neoconservative project of endless war. 
Neither endless accumulation nor endless war is feasible, sustainable or desirable 
for the great majority of the world’s people. This chapter has sought to disentan-
gle corporatism from its deliberate conflation with globalization. In so doing my 
task has included disturbing the universalist and globalist pretensions of corporat-
ism’s projection of globalization, which includes an exploding financial sector 
and bubble-based crises that increasingly feed on stagnation.
At this juncture, it is becoming highly apposite to challenge the neoliberal and 
neoconservative projections of globalization, and to envision and enact a grass-
roots and humane globalization. In Chapter 3, I argue that efforts by an emerging 
global democratic movement have moved from merely opposing and contesting 
the social costs of the neoliberal, corporatist globalization agenda towards build-
ing globalization from the grassroots. A progressive propositional politics would 
see networked communities and movements invest in cultivating their capaci-
ties and incubating their ideas, and where possible subventing strategies for net-
worked economic initiatives.
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